

HITLER, ADOLF

The following is a description of the General Headquarters of Hitler as related by an aide of northern Hungary on a recent visit to Hitler:

From his special train, Hitler directs all operations personally, devoting to them his undivided attention and taking the most scrupulous care over details. From this train he has 'conducted' the campaigns in Poland, Belgium, the Low Countries, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Yugoslavia. Still in the same train, the Chancellor is today issuing his orders to the entire Russian front, which extends for thousands of kilometres.

Adolph Hitler has spent nearly two years in his G.H.Q. which with its military offices and modern installations constitutes the

most highly perfected caravan - if I may so term it - in the world. News from all parts converges and is assembled there; it is there that decisions are reached and all plans concerning the war are drawn up; to that point all reports, whether of major or minor importance, are directed; troop advances or retreats, however small the units, movements and action of submarines and aircraft and details of the gigantic, almost inconceivable, organisation for supplying the armies - a titanic task, organised with clockwork precision.

It will not surprise anybody to hear that this G.H.Q. is carefully concealed in the woods, in the places where it cannot be detected by enemy 'planes. It is known, however, that at whatever sector of the front it happens to be, a larger number of anti-aircraft guns are placed

together with an extra heavy reinforcement of military pickets.

In the middle of the encampment is the Fuehrer's coach, and around him are the various offices, which can be dismantled in a few minutes: cars, autocars and caterpillar-cars complete the circle.

The geographical and topographical maps on which the development of operations in the East are noted hour by hour are situated in a separate tent called "the eastern tent". In the tent set aside for the 'west' are the geographical plans relating to operations against England.

Among the various cars at the Headquarters is that of Herr Dietrich, head of the Reich press; beside the radio coaches are placed those for wireless telegraphy. There a stupendous

wireless station in the world whose wave-length is not picked up by these installations, which are equipped with all the latest improvements. The men in charge of these posts work day and night.

The Fuehrer is therefore kept informed of all that is happening in the Reich and all over the world, hour by hour, minute by minute, and if he does not go mad it is because he is a genius, a phenomenon of nature - which indeed is tantamount to being mad.

Hitler generally spends the greater part of his day in the so-called 'eastern tent.' With his marshals he studies developments in the military situation with minute attention. It is doubtless in this tent that the ideas and plans which surprise the enemy are conceived. I would even venture to say that it is there that modern strategy is evolved. And those in the

Fuehrer's immediate circle do not conceal or dispute the fact that every plan which has determined the German victories has been his work. His is the spirit which guides this formidable war machine, the greatest of all time. From this G.H.Q. he also directs the Reich's internal affairs. The Ministers, the Party Chiefs, Goebbels and von Ribbentrop, visit the Chancellor 'somewhere on the eastern front.'

He nearly always travels by plane. He has at his disposal an enormous 'FOKKER UL' and a tiny 'JUNKERS 51' of the type used by the air force. He uses one or other of these machines as a rule when visiting the various sectors of the front. The sheds of the G.H.Q. also contain a third machine which is capable of landing on any sort of ground. Furthermore he has at his

Also a very high-powered army car in which

he visits the combatant forces and a smaller
runabout called an 'UBERLAND-WAGEN.'

he eat the same food as his soldiers
and sometimes takes his meals in the military
canteens.

People who have had the opportunity of
seeing him at close quarters say that during these
two years of war his appearance has not changed.
The lines on his rather pale face have perhaps
deepened a little but he still keeps his good
humor and perfect health. His hair is beginning
to go grey at the temples, but his step has not
lost its elasticity, and he holds himself very
erect.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 14, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Administration Building

Dear Colonel:

On various occasions you have suggested that it would be a good idea if someone around the office would take time off to "think like Hitler". The memorandum which is here appended represents an attempt on the part of the Economics Division in that direction.

If you are interested in it, I should like to discuss it further with you.

Sincerely yours,

ES

Edward S. Mason

HITLER'S PROBLEM IN 1942

Acceleration of the U.S. war program will progressively shift the balance of military strength against the Axis. For the present, however, the limited forces of the Allies have been attenuated by Japanese action in the Pacific. It is, therefore, Hitler's problem to utilize the period of continued Axis superiority to assure the lasting success of his venture.

Hitler must choose between two possible courses of action:

- (a) To end the war by decisive military victory.
- (b) To attain such a degree of economic and military security that he will be rendered impregnable to attack; and on that basis attempt to negotiate peace.

No course of military action leads unerringly to negotiated peace. Hitler has already misjudged his enemy's staying-power on several occasions. The British did not capitulate, as expected, after Dunkirk nor during the subsequent Battle of Britain. The Russians have not yielded to German power, despite serious losses. And the Allies will not surrender after Singapore. Barring decisive military defeat to all his major enemies, Hitler may attempt, but can not count upon a negotiated peace.

There is, at most, but one opportunity to end the war by decisive victory: a successful invasion of England. This, however, is certain to be a costly enterprise. Of all possible theatres, Great Britain is the one most

accessible to prompt and effective American aid. An invasion could not, further, be attempted with major Russian armies at bay in the east. And, if successful, it does not guarantee that the United States, the Dominions, and China, would cease to fight. On the basis of present information, therefore, a German attempt to invade England must be regarded as the least likely course of action that Hitler will undertake.

II. The Basic Strategy

A weighing of the alternatives, as well as the present disposition of German forces and the direction of her diplomatic action, suggest that Hitler will attempt the second line of action, - that designed to render his empire impregnable.

German tactics early in the war appear to have been based on the assumption that a series of short, sharp military campaigns would achieve, in time, total victory. This sporadic warfare would not be particularly costly. Resources would be reconstituted by each successive conquest, strength regained in the periods between campaigns. The initiative would always rest with Germany. And her enemies, piecemeal, would be destroyed or capitulate.

These tactics have not succeeded, and offer no prospect of success, against Hitler's major enemies: Russia, England and the United States. Their collective defeat - or even the retention against them of gains already won - now looms as a long continuous struggle.

Thus Hitler must attempt to guarantee the long-run economic security of his empire; and he must deny the Allies bridgeheads for their growing armed forces.

III. Alternative Campaigns

Hitler's requirements for obtaining economic and military security involve one or more of the following:

- a. Conquest and consolidation of the entire Ukraine and the Caucasus (or at least the North Caucasus).
- b. Neutralization of Russia as a military threat, by force of arms or by agreement.
- c. Establishment of full control of North Africa and the Mediterranean from Casablanca and the Canary Islands to Suez and the Levant.
- d. Acquisition of the Middle Eastern oil-producing areas.
- e. Renewal of intensive attacks on the Allies at their most vulnerable point - shipping.

Of these alternatives, the first, third, and fifth seem to rank highest in urgency. The second, for reasons discussed below, is likely to be attempted, if at all, only after success of the first is assured. The fourth is contingent upon the successful achievement of at least one and, because otherwise dangerous, probably all three of the preceding objectives. The fifth move - an accelerating attack on Allied shipping - is independent of the others and may be expected regardless of other decisions.

IV. The Alternatives Examined

THE UKRAINE AND THE CAUCASUS

The Ukraine and the Caucasus would constitute a valuable economic prize. The latter's oil and the former's agriculture and industrial raw materials would significantly

case the tight German situation with respect to petroleum, food, and clothing materials. Although considerable time would be required fully to exploit these resources Hitler, with the Ukraine and the North Caucasus firmly in his grasp, would have taken a long step towards the goal of a self-sufficient Germany.

The attainment of this objective would require a major offensive on the southern Russian front beginning, presumably, early in April, accompanied by holding operations on the Central and Northern Fronts. Unless the Russians committed the tactical error of risking their whole armed force to oppose the German push, a campaign in the North Caucasus would not rid Hitler of his eastern threat. He could, however, by pushing his offensive out off the principal oil supplies to the Army and Air Forces and markedly weaken their effectiveness.

The conclusion of such a campaign would still confront Hitler with the necessity of defending a frontier in the east considerably more than 1000 miles long. How large a force would have to be held in Russia for this purpose would depend mainly on the offensive strength which remained to oppose him. No doubt such a force would have to be considerable. To avoid the necessity of maintaining large concentrations on the Russian front indefinitely Hitler will have to neutralize his eastern enemy.

NEUTRALIZATION OF RUSSIA AS A MILITARY GOAL

(a) By Conquest

If Germany can eliminate the Russian armies in 1942 without suffering such loss as to make her position in the west insecure in 1943, she will presumably attempt to do

so. A consideration, however, of the strength of the Russian forces, the distances over which withdrawal is possible, and the magnitude of the supply problems which would confront the advancing German armies, leads us to the conclusion that Russian resistance cannot be crushed in 1942 unless tactical errors lead to the risking of too great a share of Russian manpower and material in stubborn and unsuccessful defense of fixed positions.

If this is the German view, the question which will confront the High Command is, how much of an advance on the Central and Northern Front will it be profitable to make? The further the advance the weaker the enemy becomes in terms of material, productive capacity, and manpower but the longer become the German supply lines and the greater the cost in expended manpower and material. If Leningrad and Moscow can be taken without an exorbitant wastage of resources - and this seems to us probable - it will be done. But the German advance will fall short of decisive results. If this reasoning is correct, it follows that Germany will be confronted at the end of 1942 with its eastern enemy still in the field - though in a seriously weakened state - unless, in the meantime, peace terms can be negotiated.¹

(b) By Peace negotiations

It is clear that Stalin is fighting his own war, not that of the Anglo-Saxon powers. If at any stage the

1. A factor which is difficult to evaluate is the possibility that the Japanese will be able and willing to attack in Siberia if Hitler gives the word. Clearly the final neutralization of Russia can be accomplished jointly by these Axis powers much more readily than by one alone.

advantages to Russia of a negotiated peace outweigh those of continuing the war, Stalin will negotiate. It is difficult to see, however, that anything short of the expectation by Stalin that Germany will be able (a) to crush the Russian armies completely, and (b) to hold off indefinitely the Anglo-Saxon powers in the west, would lead to a balance in favor of peace for Russia.

There can be no doubt that Germany would welcome the opportunity to free its hands of Russia for the struggle in the west and would be prepared to pay highly for it if she could be sure thereby of neutralizing Russia. But the only safe way of neutralizing Russia would be by disarming her and it is more than doubtful whether a peace based on Russian disarmament would be acceptable to Stalin unless he were convinced that the struggle is hopeless. Since it is our opinion, on existing evidence, that the crushing of armed resistance in Russia is beyond Germany's strength in the period before the Allies are ready to engage Germany extensively in the west, it follows that we regard the neutralization of Russia by peace negotiations as unlikely.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that Russian strength and will to resist may be heavily influenced by the margin of supplies that Britain and the United States succeed in transporting to the Russian front.

GERMAN CONTROL OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

The events of the past year in North Africa may well be interpreted by Hitler to indicate the feasibility of a push to the Suez Canal and the elimination of the British fleet from the Mediterranean with forces no larger than can be spared from the Russian campaign.

The shipping shortage has apparently made it thus far impossible for the Allies to assemble in Egypt a force sufficient to drive the relatively small Axis concentration from Libya. In the meantime, the Far Eastern conflict is diverting shipping and war supplies which might otherwise have gone to Egypt. The circumstances therefore appear propitious for an Axis drive on the Suez Canal, accompanied by heavy air attack on British Fleet units in the Mediterranean. Such an operation would require an extensive air and troop concentration and would tax severely Axis shipping facilities; but it does not seem out of the question even in conjunction with heavy engagements in Russia.

The advantages to the Axis of control of the Mediterranean and of the African approaches to Europe are very considerable. Egyptian cotton would remedy the serious Axis textile shortage. Cobalt, olive oil, and phosphate fertilizer, now flowing irregularly from French North Africa, would move unimpeded. Turkey, cut off, like Sweden, from intercourse with other powers, would undoubtedly export chrome, wool, tobacco, and foodstuffs overland to Germany. Hitler would thereby have brought Turkey into the German economic orbit without having risked the uncertainties of a difficult campaign.

It appears unlikely that the Axis, in control of the North African littoral, from Suez to Tunis, would experience serious political or military difficulties in occupying Northwest Africa. With the whole North African coast in its hands the most feasible bridgeheads to Europe would be denied to the Allies, and important

new bases for attack on Allied shipping, could be brought to bear.

On the whole, the advantages to the Axis of control of the Mediterranean would seem to justify a large-scale expenditure of resources. And since offensive operations against Russia can not begin until April, a Mediterranean campaign, immediately undertaken, need conflict but little with the later offensive.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East - Iran and Iraq - plays a complex role in the German strategic position. It is, first, a major source of oil. But if the Caucasus is successfully occupied by Germany, the oil fields of the Middle East will not then be an economic objective of immediate importance. Second, the Middle East represents a potential base for attack on Europe. If Hitler acquires the Caucasus and the Mediterranean, however, its importance in this respect will be virtually neutralized. But the oil fields of the Middle East serve also as a major source of supply to Allied naval and merchant vessels operating in the Indian Ocean. The loss of this source, if combined with the loss of Far Eastern oil supplies, would weaken the blockade in the area, facilitate trade with the Far East, where Japan now holds rubber and tin supplies badly needed by Germany, and isolate China and India after the manner of Turkey. It is, then, as part of a pincer movement on Allied oil supplies in the East that Germany is most likely to undertake a campaign against Iran and Iraq.

The German arm of this pincer is not likely to be attempted, however, until the Mediterranean and Caucasus campaigns are completed and new bases consolidated. It

involves, at least, extended and tenuous lines of communication as well as long and vulnerable flanks. It is not a campaign essential to the German plan as outlined earlier. It hinges on the success of previous German and Japanese operations.

CONCLUSIONS

It is judged to be Hitler's aim in 1942 to master an area as impregnable as possible to Allied attack, and capable of maintaining a continuously high war potential. This end can be virtually achieved by (a) the conquest of the Ukraine and the North Caucasus; (b) a further considerable advance on the North and Central Fronts in Russia, which would, at the same time, seriously weaken Russian strength and willingness to resist; and (c) the conquest and occupation of the areas bordering on the Mediterranean.

The results of such an achievement by the Axis would be so disastrous to Allied interests as largely to nullify the advantage in armed strength expected in 1943. Aggressive measures are imperative at the earliest possible moment.

Our alternatives, like Hitler's, are two:

- (1) To strive for decisive victory in 1942.
- (2) To prevent Hitler from achieving his goal of impregnability this year.

We cannot wait for our increased war production to become effective in 1943 and thereafter.

The first alternative could be accomplished only by successful invasion of the European continent. This is regarded as impossible by American and British military authorities. It is therefore essential that Allied strategy be focussed on achieving the second alternative.

The general priority of Allied counter-action would appear to be:

1. Quickly effective aid to Russia. The quantities of immediately useful military supplies sent to this area should be limited only by the capacity of Russian ports to discharge and to dispatch cargo. The existence of an eastern front in 1943 is essential to Allied success.
2. The maintenance or acquisition of bridgeheads to Europe on the North African coast. If Egypt can be held, the conditions for an Allied offensive in Europe are immeasurably improved.
3. Aid to China and to the Dutch, in an effort to prevent the denial of Far Eastern oil to the Allies and the opening of commercial shipping lanes between Japan and German controlled areas.

Only the immediate contemplation of a large-scale offensive in the west would justify the continued shipment of men and material to Britain at the present time in competition with the program indicated above.

The importance of shipping to above objectives is obvious. Equally clear is the need to give ship-building high priority in our production program.

Translation

Report by Bavarian State Police, Munich – September 22, 1924

Report to the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior, Munich

**RE: The conditional parole of the writer Adolf Hitler, of the
veterinarian Dr. Fridrich Weber, and of the Lieutenant Colonel retd.
Hermann Kriebel**

C
O
P
Y

BAVARIAN STATE POLICE, MUNICH

Munich, September 22, 1924

IV a.Nr.:2427

Report to the Bavarian State Ministry
of the Interior, Munich

Re: The conditional parole of the writer ADOLF HITLER,
of the veterinarian Dr. FRIEDRICH WEBER, and of
the Lieutenant Colonel retd. HERMANN KRIEBEL

The State Police Department has already expressed its opinion in the report of May 8, 1924 to the effect that, in consideration of the temperament and energy, with which Hitler pursues his political ambitions, it is to be definitely assumed that he would not give up these ambitions even after his release from imprisonment; but that he will remain a continual danger for the inner and exterior security of the State. Until the present time no reason has been found which could have led the police department to a change of its former opinion.

If the police department takes the stand that Hitler and Dr. Weber should not be released on October 1, 1924, this decision is based on the following reasons: Even during the trial the three defendants have repeatedly declared that immediately upon their release they will again promote the National

CLASSIFICATION

CANCELED
CHANGED TO

SECRET

BY ALT

IN

DATE

DATE

Executive Secretary
Strategic Services Unit
14 Mar 1968

Socialist movement and that they will continue to work in the same manner as formerly. Hitler, Kriebel, and Dr. Weber are now as before the leaders of the dissolved para-military troops and the spiritual leaders of its now existing camouflaged front organizations. Therefore a release of the three named persons, even on conditional parole should not be considered. However, should the court unexpectedly grant a parole it would be compulsory for the given reason to deport Hitler as the soul of the entire nationalistic and racial movement in order to avoid the immediate danger to the Bavarian State. In respect to this I refer to my previous report of May 8, 1942 in which I fully explained the reasons of my request for Hitler's deportation from Bavaria.

The numerous riots committed by his followers until the time of the Putsch are to be accredited to his influence. The moment he is set free Hitler will, because of his energy, become immediately again the generator of repeated heavy riotous disturbances of the public order. He will continuously endanger the security of the State. Hitler will resume his political activities, and the hope of the nationalists and racists that he will succeed in removing the present dignity and the disunion among the officials of the para-military troops will

CLASSIFICATION

CANCELED
CHANGED TO

SECRET

BY AUTHORITY OF

NAME

BY

DATE

Gen. Secy
Strategic Service Unit -
14 Mar. 1968

be fulfilled. Hitler's influence on all nationalistic inclined - today he is more than before the soul of the entire movement - will again carry the entire movement forward. It will even absorb great masses of persons who are now foreign to his ranks and convert them to the idea of the National Socialist German Workers' Party. In order to accomplish this he will greatly revive the mass assemblies, he will organize demonstrations as before the Putsch, and we can surely expect such outbreaks as are still vivid in our memory. Hitler will again take up his relentless fight against the Government and not abstain from violations of the law even if he is to face the revocation of his parole.

Therefore it is completely immaterial whether, as expressed, he will take up his residence in Berlin or in the Mecklenburgs upon his release or whether he will remain in Munich itself.

(signed) illegible
The Director of the Bavarian State Police,
Munich

Notes: Hitler's sentence for high treason: five years confinement in a fortress.
Served: four months and two weeks before the trial.
Begin of imprisonment: April 1, 1924.
Normal end of confinement: November 28, 1928.
Actual date of release: December 26, 1924.

CLASSIFICATION


CANCELED
CHANGED TO

SECRET

BY AUTHORITY OF

NAME Lieut. Gray
OFFICE SSU
DATE 14 Mar 1968

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK



MEMORANDUM

April 27, 1942

To: Colonel William J. Donovan
 From: J. F. Gurney
 Subject: Hitler's Speech

The outstanding points about the Hitler speech seem to me these:

1. There seems to have been no good reason for making the speech except the necessity for dealing with the German internal situation.

(a) The whole first part seems to attempt to say to the German people: "I did not start this war. The British and the Jews did." The length of this section would indicate that there must be people in Germany who feel that this is Hitler's war and who are dissatisfied with it.

(b) The section which deals with the winter campaign is defensive in nature. It seems in a way to apologize for certain severe measures which had to be taken, which clearly indicates that there was, if not mutiny, at least widespread dissatisfaction among the troops. We have had such stories of dissatisfaction from various sources.

(c) The promises that the railroads will work better; the supply organizations be more effective, etc. imply that they broke down during the winter.

(d) The violent denunciation of RAF bombings and the threat of reprisals seems to have been purely for German consumption, since this whole section was omitted from the English version transmitted to England. This section was therefore not intended to frighten the British but to reassure the Germans. The implication is that the Germans are badly rattled by the RAF bombings.

2. It is notable that the speech contains no promise of victory in 1942, or, for that matter, any other time. It stresses the necessity for avoiding defeat, but lacks any of the assurance of previous speeches.

4. It is notable that Miller stressed the submarine as the weapon by which a could subjugate England. There is no hint of invasion, and aerial warfare is only mentioned as a peripheral concern.

Let \mathcal{P}_1 be the probability measure on \mathcal{P} defined by

[illegible]

... "I, myself, in submitting to you the
 following and other references to the Trinity and to
 Providence, and any persons indicate that I am, or that
 I am not, in accordance with myself and the Church's view."

Conclusion: The largest effect appears to be the difference that Germany has suffered in the winter than we have been inclined to assume, that the Germans are themselves quite worried, and that they are probably going into this spring and summer with a far less definite plan and with less confidence than we have been inclined to assume.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Restricted Classification
Removed For
Executive Order 10801

HITLER'S SPEECH OF APRIL 26, 1942.

May 13, 1942

RESTRICTED

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

HITLER'S SPEECH OF APRIL 26, 1942.

In his speech of April 26, 1942, Hitler requested the Reichstag to grant him extraordinary powers to curb special privilege and to punish the slackers impeding Germany's war effort. Most American press commentators have viewed this request as an indication that Hitler feels threatened by internal disintegration. The validity of this interpretation is open to serious doubt. The present level of German war production would not indicate any effective decline in German morale, nor is there any sign that Germany's lack of enthusiasm, present ever since the outbreak of war, has noticeably increased. Moreover, Hitler's request for more power must have impressed the German citizen as essentially meaningless. No German is so naive as to assume that Hitler has held, for at least six years, anything less than complete power. Even the courts of law, which Hitler particularly assails in his speech as defenders of unwarranted privilege, have long since been subject to the will of the Party.

An examination of Hitler's new appeal in the broader context of Germany's domestic propaganda line suggests a different interpretation of its meaning. Ever since the outbreak of war, the apathy of the German people has been widely recognized. In order to overcome

RESTRICTED

Restricted Classification
Excluded From
Automatic Order 10501

the feeling of deep foreboding which was so widespread among Germans to whom the sufferings of the last war were still a living memory, Nazi propaganda concentrated on assuring the home front that it would not suffer in this war as it did in the last. The prosperity of the German citizen has been repeatedly contrasted to the smaller rations of the English and to the utter frightfulness of the Russian citizen's life.

Although this propaganda probably helped to encourage the civilian population, there is reason to believe that it has had a contrary effect in the rank and file of the Army. The German press, particularly the Schwarze Korps, which enjoys a wide circulation in the Army, has lately been replete with articles condemning the home front for not assuming its full share of the burden. Even State and Party officials have not been spared by the Schwarze Korps in its criticisms of life behind the front.

It is apparent that the "home-front-prosperity" line has gone too far, and is proving a boomerang. It may have been cheering to the new recruit to know that folks back home were being cared for, but the soldier who is going through the hell of the Russian campaign can find little cheer in the assurance that life is relatively normal on the home front. The dogged assistance rendered

RESTRICTED

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10801

by the Russian civilian population to the Red Army showed the German soldier what a "home" front could do in total war.

The articles in the Schwarze Korps and elsewhere have represented his point of view. Hitler himself is now taking up the cudgels for the common soldier. In his speech he describes at length the sufferings of the Army in the Russian campaign, in comparison with which the inconveniences on the home front are as naught. He went to the front partly to show the soldiers that he was sharing their sacrifice. Now he is demanding on their behalf that the civilian population do the same.

When the nation was growing anxious about the reversal in Russia, Hitler took over personal responsibility from the generals. He is now reassuring the Army by assuming full responsibility for the conduct of the home front, a responsibility previously assigned to the Party.

Hitler's request for new powers means that Germany will have to tighten its belt. It is no sign, however, that internal disintegration is setting in. Hitler is simply trying to overcome the effects of his earlier "home-prosperity" propaganda, and to apply in Germany some of the lessons in total warfare which the Russian home front has taught him.

RESTRICTED

- 4 -

Profoundly conscious of his role as a "world-historical personality," Hitler rarely speaks to the world without discoursing at length upon the meaning of the War. His interpretations of the War, however, change with its course.

At the outbreak, he had conceived the meaning of the conflict in terms of issues which were essentially national in character. The solution of the Polish Corridor problem, the rectification of the last of the wrongs of Versailles; these were the reasons Hitler advanced for going to war. After the entrance of the Italians into the conflict, he explained the war as the struggle of the Have Not's against the Have's for an equal share in the wealth of the world.

In the present speech the latter interpretation is only alluded to in passing; the former is totally ignored. Hitler speaks now not simply as the leader of the Germans, not simply as the leader of the Have Not's, but as the leader of Europe. The emphasis he places on the necessity for European solidarity indicates that the "New Order" concept has assumed a new centrality in his thinking. This centrality clearly derives from his realization that without the full mobilization of Europe, he cannot successfully wage the two front war which threatens him. Hitler took the gamble of being able to defeat his foes one at a

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10801

RESTRICTED

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10801

time. The fact that Russia's armies are still intact, and that the United States is now a full participant presents him with the live possibility of the very two front situation which he sought to avoid. One may deduce from his high compliments to all the European nations which have aided him that he is well aware that the resources and manpower of Europe as well as those of Germany will be even more necessary when both fronts become a reality.

At the same time Hitler does not openly recognize the existence of a two front situation. In order to arouse his European followers, he concentrates exclusively on the Russian menace. He belittles the role of England in the war, and argues that she no longer represents a force in European politics. He implies, however, that the only hope for the survival of her Empire lies in cooperation with unified Europe. He ignores entirely the prowess of the United States. Our participation in the war is to him utterly incomprehensible, since he "does not see" how the interests of the United States are in any way involved in the conflict. He likewise argues that the United States will be the inheritor of the British Empire. This may be his last effort to divide the American people from its leaders and at the same time from its British Allies.

RESTRICTED

- 6 -

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

The cardinal sin of Great Britain and the United States, according to Hitler, is that they are abettors of the Communist Revolution. He tries to show that both these powers are pursuing a policy contrary to their own interests as well as to that of civilization in general. It is in this effort that he arrives at a newly unified philosophy of the War designed to appeal to the middle class the world over. He casts his argument in terms of the Marxian dialectic, with which middle class European thought has been so largely tinctured.

The Jews occupy the center of the stage in Hitler's new theory. Their aim is, of course, to achieve world domination. Democracy provides them with the opportunity. In the democracies the Jews, at the expense of the indigenous population, are able to arrogate most of the wealth. They thus create a large oppressed proletariat which the Jews then exploit to subvert the existing social order. When revolution comes, the dialectic process reaches its final phase, in which the Jews take over political and economic power completely and exploit the enslaved peoples. Great Britain and the United States therefore represent the first phase of the Jewish-inspired class conflict. Under their Jewish leaders they are misguidedly fighting simply to preserve the possibility for world revolution. Hence it is entirely natural that they should be fighting at Russia's side.

~~RESTRICTED~~

- 7 -

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10801

So intent is Hitler upon convincing the world that the war is to be viewed as a gigantic Communist plot, that he professes to see no meaning in the war before the outbreak of the Russian phase. He must be convinced that he has the definitive argument for Germany's present enterprise, for he does not, even by refutation, allude to the charges of aggression made against him. His entire effort is to obliterate from the European memory the nationalist issues which played such a large role in his original rationale of the war. The propaganda of the United Nations, therefore, should take particular pains to keep before the European peoples the nature of the tie which binds them against Hitler despite their differing conceptions of social order.

Comments on Hitler's Speech of April 20, 1942

The principal features of Hitler's speech appear to me to be as follows:

1. This speech is one of Hitler's best carefully considered utterances in its form as well as in its substance.

Not all parts of the speech are directed to the same audience, a fact which gives the speech a qualitative effect.

2. The entire first part becomes intelligible only if it is taken as an attempt to awaken doubts in the minds of the British of the wisdom of continuing the war. The whole academic analysis of the British position and balance of power politics converges on the argument that whoever wins this war the British people will lose it. They will lose it even if only to Russia and the United States.

The section on anti-Semitism is designed to have the same effect. However absurd it may appear to us, Hitler is still firmly convinced of the usefulness of anti-Semitic propaganda as a weapon of disinformation in Great Britain and the United States. The reply that Hitler employs the term "Jewish" in a sense so vague that it becomes meaningless is no good evidence against this interpretation of his speech. He has frequently done that before, especially in his more formal speeches.

3. Any attempt to get at the meaning and purpose of the crucial sections of the speech should not neglect to consider the fact that Hitler thinks of himself as no mean tactician. His arctic bayonet withstood the winter, everyone expected a fire-eating speech which would announce the spring offensive. Instead he dwells at great length and in great detail on the extreme difficulties of the Russian winter, openly discusses the partial breakdown of the German transport and supply systems, and speaks of a catastrophe narrowly averted. He goes farther than this; he speaks of nerves snapping, of obedience denied, and of lack of a sense of duty in waterwing these difficulties. In this connection he refers to his brutal decisions made on the basis of the "sovereign rights" delegated to him by the German people. Whether he is speaking of individual cases or of mass desertions, he does not specify. In any case he refers to them as isolated instances.

Whatever his purpose on the home front, Hitler knows and must know that such remarks as these will be interpreted abroad as evidence of a weakening morale. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this effect was deliberately aimed at. Indeed, in Britain and the United States

it did have this effect. Mr. Harburg's argument that this was not a plant because in the English version transmitted later to England over the radio this section was omitted, is irrelevant, because both Goebbels and Hitler must know that on an occasion such as this every word is listened to. I should also dismiss as unworthy of serious consideration any difference between Goebbels' and Hitler's propaganda line.

As far as the home front is concerned these remarks coupled with the extraordinary law have a purpose that is also fairly clear. There was a failure in Russia that was due not only to the severity of the winter and Hitler admits it. If I understand this speech correctly, he seems to say that the prime factor in the German failure was the severity of the Russian winter, but he wants also to emphasize these isolated instances of nerves snapping, of disobedience (whether mass or individual), of administrative bottlenecks which required "brutal decisions".

Why did he ask for this added power when he already possesses it, as he says, by virtue of his "sovereign rights"? The only answer I can find is: he wanted to broadcast to the widest possible German audience the warning that dereliction of duty, inefficiency, half-hearted

support of the war against Russia will no longer be tolerated.

He can do this only by spreading terror, because that is the only way in which the Nazi state can act. Undetermined so far as the speech is concerned, must remain the question whether he is speaking only of isolated instances or of a mass phenomenon.

It is fairly clear that Hitler already had the power to dismiss any civil servant, judge, or party official. I am not so certain that he could dismiss an army officer without a court martial. Yet there is no good reason to believe that the decree is directed first at army officers, for there is no convincing evidence of a rift between party and army. But there were admittedly administrative bottle-necks, especially in the Weichsbahn administration which he singles out for special mention. That is why he appointed Jakob Werlin some weeks ago.

One should not forget that the bureaucracy, though Nazified, is not entirely Nazi. Even an absolute ruler or a dictator in a hurry has difficulties in overcoming bureaucratic delays and routine. Hitler's only possible remedy in such a situation is terror. But this law also applies to business men who dislike their contracts, to judges who

have a lingering sense of justice, so workers can so in compulsory labor until now was limited in time.

In a word, the speech and the law are not evidence of a cracking German morale. They are a precautionary warning to all Germans in the face of the arduous spring and summer that lie ahead. The speech aims at stiffening morale at home. It would make no sense to say that it just have a demoralizing effect on Germans. Miller knows Germans perhaps better than we do and if his party mechanism for feeling public opinion tells him that a dose of terror will strengthen German morale, he will not hesitate.

The speech therefore, if it is intelligible at all, aims at exactly opposite effects at home and abroad.

M. L. Born

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. William L. Langer

From: Walter C. Langer

Subject: Analysis of Hitler's Speech of April 26, 1942

I have worked over Hitler's speech of April 26, 1942 in considerable detail with several of my colleagues. We are agreed that the speech is rather atypical for Hitler. It lacks the effusiveness to which we have become accustomed. There are no emotional outbursts and few vituperations. Much of the cockiness is gone and there is no mention of the superiority of German arms or equipment, sufficiency of food or raw materials and no claim of victory in the near future. The speaker gives the impression of being on the defensive and appears as a modest, cautious and even apologetic individual. He admits that there is and has been dissension in Germany and "requests" that power be granted him to deal with such dissension summarily. All this seems extremely foreign to the speaker in view of his past performances.

A careful analysis of the speech reveals that it is one of the most calculated that he has ever given. Every sentence has a direct bearing on the central theme and every lie and distortion is designed to serve a practical end rather than to induce a pleasant or satisfactory feeling in the listener. It is only after a careful study of the speech as a whole that its

Page 2 - Langer Memorandum

underlying purpose becomes clear. This primary purpose, from a psychoanalytic point of view, is to lay the foundations for a peace offer in the not too distant future.

To the casual reader or listener this purpose is not immediately obvious. On the contrary, the casual listener is inclined to conclude that the German morale is cracking and that Germany is in a bad way. Unquestionably, there is some dissension within Germany and some discontent with the progress of the war and particularly with the failure of the Russian campaign. There may be another reason which is even more telling, which we will consider later on. Why does Hitler speak of this dissension so openly? This is a double-edged technique the Nazis adopted early last Fall. On the one hand, it is designed to throw dust into the eyes of the people in the democracies in order to weaken their war effort by creating the impression that the war is almost over and there is no sense in exerting themselves or sacrificing too many of their liberties or luxuries. This is the old technique of lulling their opponents into inactivity. On the other hand, it is their modern technique of whipping the Germans into making a still greater war effort. Hitler and Goebbels both initiated this technique last Fall in speeches and writings in which superhuman efforts were demanded from the people on the grounds that if Germany wins it wins everything, but if it loses they can expect no mercy - the German nation would be annihilated and even Versailles

Page 3 - Langer Memorandum

would be generous in comparison with the peace which would follow this war. Therefore, whether they liked it or not, or whether they were in sympathy with the war or not, they were all in it now and they would all be judged together. This is the typical "partners in crime" code and their only hope of salvation in the future was to stick together and shoot it out to a successful conclusion. The result is that when the leaders now want greater effort, they talk about how badly things are going in order to arouse the fear of failure in the population.

It is possible that this section of the speech has still another purpose. It seems that Hitler goes out of his way to create the impression that he is not the ruthless individual of the past but a modest, honest, open, dutiful and law-abiding leader whose personal integrity is above question. His only concern is for the welfare of his people and the future of Germany. At heart he is really a peace-loving individual who has made every effort to spare his people the horrors of war, but since war was forced on him they must have complete faith in his leadership and share the sacrifices and observe their duties until he can restore peace to them. In other words, he avoids the gangster role and assumes the role of the benign leader to whom harsh measures are unpleasant but necessary in the interests of his people. It is logical to suppose that this new role is adopted now in order to make his future peace overtures more acceptable to the peoples of the United Nations.

Page 4 - Langer Memorandum

The long historical introduction concerning the British Empire was construed by us as material for the Fifth Columnists abroad. The general theme is that England is not strong now and never was strong; that her Empire was built up by cunning rather than by might. By means of her position she was able to utilize the disrupted state of Europe, a condition which she did not create, and turn it to her own advantage. The success of her theory of "balance of power" depends upon keeping European states fighting among themselves. England's entry into the last war was designed to maintain this condition on the Continent in order that her own position in the world could be preserved. She lacked the power to accomplish this in the last war and would have failed completely if she had not called the United States into the war at the eleventh hour to help her.

Even the last war sealed the doom of England. Instead of recognizing the inevitability of changes due to the evolutionary process, England was striving to maintain an earlier stage of development which was no longer tenable. The result was that on the one hand she wasted so much of her might in achieving victory in the last war that she has incapacitated herself for future challenges (Fuehrungskrieg in the transcription should probably read "Pyrrhuskrieg"). On the other hand, by calling to the United States for help she raised that country to a dominant position in world affairs - a position which England herself could not combat.

Page 5 - Langer Memorandum

This historical approach, designed to prove that England is on the skids and cannot hope to maintain her present position, is not new in Nazi propaganda. Such arguments were frequently advanced in 1940 and it is interesting to note that they were dropped when their peace overtures, after the collapse of France, had failed. It is now resurrected and reenforced by additional evidence to show that Europe is no longer divided against itself. On the contrary, it has reached an unbelievable state of unification in which Germans, Italians, Slovaks, Rumanians, Hungarians, Finns, Lithuanians, Letts and even Belgians, French, Ukrainians, etc., fight side by side in combatting an external and common danger. Against such an array of unified power, England's "balance of power" theory is ineffectual. Even if, with the help of the United States, she should happen to win she would win nothing, while if she loses she will lose everything. Her only hope of salvation, therefore, is to face the reality of the situation and work with this unified Europe rather than against it.

According to Hitler the factor which brought about this final unification of Europe was the recognition of the dangers inherent in the Jewish-Bolshevist combine which seeks to enslave the world. This section of the speech seems to be directive material for the Fifth Columnists in this country as well as in England. Capitalism and democracy are the Jews' stepping-stones to the enslavement of the people. By cultivating distrust and

Page 6 - Langer Memorandum

corruption they pave the way to anarchy and Bolshevism, etc.

Roosevelt is a madman who has surrounded himself with Jewish advisers and is under their domination. We should get out of the war against Germany, which has never harmed us or intended to harm us, and clean our own house, etc. This is excellent material for a "whispering campaign" in the democracies.

It is important to note that in all of this material there is not a word against the English or the American people themselves. On the contrary, he even has a word of praise. The campaign is designed to wean the people from their leaders by fostering suspicion and distrust in their abilities and motives. Churchill is referred to as a cynical drunkard, while Roosevelt is a sick madman. They are greedy for power and fame and care not a whit for the interests of their people. They are not fit to rule great nations.

Contrast with this situation the one existing in Germany. Even as Hitler gives the speech, the German people with unanimous acclaim vote their leader unlimited power over the life and death of every German irrespective of their hard-earned rights. They are so thoroughly convinced of his sincerity, integrity and vision that they are willing to subordinate even the judiciary to his wishes and interpretations of what is best for Germany and the future of the German people. As he looks about him, Hitler sees nothing but honest and upright subordinates who will make history. They, as the leaders of the New Order, form a strange contrast to the leaders of the

Page 7 - Langer Memorandum

democracies who must find their encouragement in the most insignificant achievements. The impression is cultivated that the people of the democracies must wake up, rid themselves of their present leaders and select others with vision and integrity who can understand the trend of events and, presumably, make peace with Hitler when the proper time comes.

The section of the speech in which he asks for this unlimited power is interesting. At first glance one gets the impression that Hitler has turned over a new leaf and now requests power before he wields it. This would be a considerable divergence from his past performances, as for example in the Blood Purge, when he wielded the power first and got authorization afterwards. On more careful reading, however, we find that he wielded such power on the Eastern Front last winter when he only believed that the German people had invested it in him. Likewise he tries to create the impression that the dissenters or slackers were few in numbers and that their failure to do their duty was solely the result of the hardships and tensions they had to endure. Then, however, we find him referring to wiping out whole groups who failed to live up to what was expected of them and we begin to wonder if the purge was not quite extensive.

His use of the term "selbsttheiligen" is significant. It is difficult to imagine anybody in Germany to whom this term was applicable who was not in the highest ranks of the military or the

Page 8 - Langer Memorandum

party and one who was not in close contact with Hitler himself. In other words, we can surmise from this remark that there are dissenters within the ranks of his closest advisers. One can imagine that this dissension is confined solely to the Russian campaign and its results. This is certainly cause for dissension but it hardly seems enough, by itself, to account for Hitler's attitude at this time when the Spring Offensive is about to begin. It may have other sources which we will consider in a moment.

In any case, it seems necessary for Hitler to hold this extraordinary power as a whip over the heads of some of his ranking officials. In order to justify his request for this extraordinary power he tries to create the impression that this is an extraordinary war and consequently must be fought by extraordinary means. The war is one of life or death for the German nation and its outcome will determine the destiny of the world for hundreds or thousands of years. A war involving such stakes can, of necessity, be determined only by a long and protracted struggle requiring more than ordinary courage and endurance. Defeat for the Germans would mean the slaughter of millions of people as it did in Russia. Everything must be sacrificed to prevent such an outcome in comparison with which the present state of the war effort, the partial starvation and the Nazi domination of all activities is infinitely better than the consequences of giving in. From which the conclusion is to be drawn

Page 9 - Langer Memorandum

that the sacrifice of all acquired rights and submission to additional Nazi terror and lawlessness are the sole protection of the German people against the Bolshevik menace.

One could also surmise from his speech that Hitler does not propose to make his peace overtures in the near future. First the Fifth Columnists must do their work, then increased submarine warfare against England and then, perhaps, some concentrated bombings which will inflict untold misery on the people, who should then be amenable to his proposals. Also, perhaps, a few spectacular victories against the Russians, although one has the feeling that in this speech he is leaving loopholes for himself to make peace overtures even though he fails to defeat Russia.

One very important point remains for consideration, namely, his scanty references to Japan. He talks at length about the great achievements of Italy which are meagre in reality and makes little mention of the achievements of Japan which are impressive. One would expect, at this time, that he would magnify them rather than to diminish them. We must suppose that he has ulterior motives in not doing so. What are these motives? From the few remarks that he makes in this speech, it is impossible to say. We might suppose that in order to woo England he must soft-pedal Japan. If the British Empire is to remain intact as he implies, provided that it works with the New Order, it would require considerable settlement with Japan. Perhaps he does not feel that this is the time to talk

Page 10 - Langer Memorandum

of such a settlement. Or, again, we might suppose that his feeble references to Japan are designed to indicate to the English that he is ready to sell them down the river whenever England is ready to talk peace. He therefore treats them lightly as though they were unimportant to his future plans.

There is, however, another possibility which seems to me even more likely, namely, that Hitler and the leading Nazis are afraid of the growing power of Japan. It looks almost as if some of the ranking Nazis were beginning to question the wisdom of the alliance with Japan and her entry into the war. While Germany struggles to acquire relatively worthless territory in Europe at terrific costs, they see Japan acquiring the colonies, rich in raw materials, which Germany has always coveted, with comparatively small losses. At the time of Hitler's speech Japan stood on the doorstep of India which has for years been the dreamland of the Germans - Japan seizes the world's riches while Germany fights for worthless territory which may prove to be a liability rather than an asset. It is possible that the German leaders are beginning to wonder who will recover these territories from Japan when the war is ended and Germany, together with the other European nations, are exhausted.

It has long been known to psychoanalysts that one of the Germans' favorite defense mechanisms in propaganda is that known as projection. By means of this mechanism they project on to others their own wishes, ambitions and fears. The clearest example is to

be found in connection with the Jews. By projection Hitler is able to accuse the Jews of planning all the things which he himself wants to do. May it not be that in the present instance he is projecting his own fears, anxieties and difficulties to the English? In one place he says that England has made a tremendous error in allying itself with the United States since in the end she will find her ally stronger than herself. The same may be true of Germany in respect of Japan. In another place he says of England that if she wins she wins nothing, while if she loses she loses everything. May this not be equally true of Germany in regard to things of value? Perhaps it is he who finds himself in the position of having sold Germany down the river to Japan and his advisers and ranking officials may be rebuking him for it.

When we view the speech in its entirety from this point of view, it begins to make sense. There is a reason for laying the foundations for peace overtures in the not too distant future. Certain it is that nowhere in the speech does Hitler lay any claim to credit for bringing Japan into the war. If everything were above-board we would expect this to be a feather in his cap. Instead of that we find that Japan's entry into the war was the result of the stupidity of the democracies. May this not be another case of projection? That all is not well is evidenced by the cool commentaries on Hitler's speech given by the Japanese radio in the days immediately following its delivery.

Page 12 - Langer Memorandum

Whatever the case may be, this latter point of view offers us an excellent opportunity for counter-propaganda to Germany. By reversing the whole picture and sending it back to Germany, [I believe] we will be striking close to doubts already existent in the minds of many Germans. While Hitler is exhausting the energies of Germany and its allies in combatting the menace of Bolshevism, he is paving the way for the Great Yellow Peril to sweep over Europe (although the latter need only be implied). It is our opinion that such an approach will tap latent anxieties which are far stronger than any connected with the Bolsheviks and help drive an opening wedge between the German people and their leaders.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William L. Langer


DATE May 14, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Comments on Hitler's Speech of April 28, 1942

I am returning to you herewith Mr. Warburg's comments on Hitler's Speech together with comments prepared by Mr. Dorn and by Mr. Schorske. I think both you and Mr. Warburg will find these comments of some interest.

I might say that I took the trouble to read the German text of the speech myself and am inclined to agree with Mr. Dorn and Mr. Schorske that while it would be a great mistake to suppose that Hitler would parade before the world the growing weakness of Germany (if it exists) it does appear fairly clear that the Nazis are confronted with growing discouragement and disillusionment on the part of the German population. I think Mr. Schorske's remarks on Hitler's constantly changing interpretation of the present conflict are very much to the point and that Hitler finds it necessary to constantly advance some new argument to convince the German people of the necessity of the conflict.


William L. Langer
Director of Research

Attachments

~~PF~~ - G.B. -

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

bol

October 28, 1942 *file*

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a memorandum I have just received in the pouch from Bill Phillips recounting a conversation he had with Dr. Benes. I thought you would like to see it.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

5
P
Y

602

October 6, 1942

At Dr. Benes' invitation I lunched alone with him today at the Ritz, in a private room. He gave me the following information.

He has just learned from what he believes to be a responsible source, and which was again confirmed to him this morning, that General Halder, the German Chief of Staff, has been dismissed. He has been succeeded by Major General Tretzler, who has been advanced rapidly to this high office, contrary to the general practice in promotions in the German Army. Dr. Benes regards this change as of extreme importance for the following reasons:

On August 9th there was held an important defense council, attended by Hitler, to deal with the military problems that would arise after the capture of Stalingrad, which it was assumed would take place in a week, that is by August 16th. A quarrel ensued between Hitler and the older Generals, including General Halder. The latter group wished to continue the offensive operation to the north, in order to get behind Moscow, destroy Timoshenko's army, and finish the war before the winter set in. Hitler was against this proposal. He wanted to stabilize the Eastern front after taking the Caucasus, and then to free one hundred divisions for the West, and for concentration against Great Britain. This quarrel between the

Generals and Hitler was of course useless, because Stalingrad has not in fact fallen. Nevertheless, the dismissal of Halder is probably related to the quarrel, and his dismissal and that of von Bock is punishment for the failures in connection with Stalingrad. The dismissal of General Halder is confirmation of the fact that Hitler has destroyed any possible revolt among the Generals.

Preparations are now going on everywhere for a defensive war in the East and in the West. The Germans have made their last big scale offensive; they are not capable of another on this scale. The military machine, however, remains powerful and terrible, and there is no question but that the subject nations will continue to be starved into submission. The Germans will and can resist until the last moment, remaining on the defensive, realizing that they cannot win, but hoping that their opponents will become exhausted meanwhile.

The dissolution of Germany from within is further advanced than the English think, and Hitler and all the high Nazis are possessed with the fear that Germany will be defeated from within, exactly as it was in the last war. They fear they will be "stabbed in the back." Because of this fear, Hitler now has more than 600,000 S.S. men behind the front. Previously he had a large proportion of his S.S. troops with him at the front, but now, according to the latest information, the last of the S.S. has been

b03

taken away from the front, and sent back into the interior of Germany for police purposes.

It is most important to realize that the S.S. now have their own bomber services from the Luftwaffe, which means also that the Luftwaffe has now become in a sense linked with the S.S. This means that everything that is done from now on by the Luftwaffe is governed by fear of internal disorder. In the beginning the S.S. was only a bodyguard for Hitler, now it is a great army, organized for internal purposes.

In Dr. Benes' opinion, if there is a second offensive, and it is sufficiently powerful, Germany will be finished a year from now, but this cannot happen until after there has been a defeat on land. A military defeat is a necessary preliminary for the collapse.

With regard to transport difficulties within Germany, Dr. Benes said that on August 31 last, there were 594,000 railway cars including those taken from the subject countries; there were 632,000 railway cars when the war began. With regard to locomotives, last month there were 6,000 less than required.

With regard to Africa, and the attitude of the Italians, they feel certain of an allied offensive in North Africa. Mussolini fears any such offensive and has asked Hitler for help from Germany. In response, movements of German engineers and materiel are crossing

604

the Brenner and defensive operations in Sicily are now being carried out.

With regard to Spain, Franco has taken two important decisions: 1) he has reached the conclusion that Germany will not win over Russia, and that Germany will therefore not win the war, and 2) that Spain must take into consideration the disappearance of the German Fascist Government. This, in Dr. Benes' opinion, is important inasmuch as Franco is a Fascist himself and because the information comes from a guaranteed source.

With regard to Russia, Dr. Benes merely repeated the point of view of Russian officials, to the effect that there will be no further action against Moscow this year, and that while another month of this effort may be expected in the region of the Caucasus, there will be no Russian disaster this autumn on either side of the Caucasian mountains.

bos

C O P Y

MEMORANDUM

C O P Y

TO: Professor Crane Brinton

FROM: Edward Deuss

SUBJECT: Recollections of Adolf Hitler
Gained from personal contact, interviews
and on airplane campaign tours with Hitler
from September 1931 - May 1933.

The most obvious thing about Hitler is the blend of inborn feminine and masculine characteristics - a man on the borderline of woman, an incredible iron will subject to unfathomable fits of depression, a Spartan self-disciplinarian who would not kill a fly except in a rage, a mystic-realist, an intuitive warrior, an ascetic adventurer.

I once asked him what he considered the most revealing statement about himself in "Mein Kampf." He replied, "A short sentence at the very beginning of the book (on page 11 in fact) in which I say that as a youth I learned the meaning of history." And the most important factor in his early upbringing, he maintained, was Roman Catholicism, combined with the teachings of his intensely German-nationalist history teacher. He sees the world as a clash of opposing forces, and genius in man as the power to synthesize these opposing forces for the purpose of evolving a third and more powerful force. His personality is a synthesis of Austria and Prussia, of Marxian materialism and metaphysics. National Socialism, he was always proud of describing as a synthesis of Nationalism and Socialism. His appeal to the German people based on this synthesis.

A monocled Prussian Junker general stomping Kaiser Germany on behalf of Pan-German expansionism would have been regarded as a joke. But the Austrian corporal aroused no such misgivings.

The meaning of history, for him, consisted of deductions from an analysis of that age-old enticing problem -- the rise and decline of civilizations. His faith in himself and his hope for Germany rested on the conviction that the great imperialist powers were subjected to a cyclical decline which presented Germany with an opportunity. His job was to build up a strong united Germany to claim the heritage of the empires at the moment of their greatest weakness. He has always made much of the fact that when the "world was divided" last time in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries Germany was compelled to look on helplessly because torn by internal strife. He does not subscribe to Carlyle's view that personalities make history; he believes that personalities appearing on the scene at opportune moments can shape the destiny of their countries. Leaders may be motivated by purely materialistic considerations but the masses of the people will fight only when moved by idealistic impulses. These idealisms have in the majority of cases been manufactured by those seeking or holding power for an express purpose, but those who seek have a chance of success only with a new religion, while those who struggle to hold must rely on the old, ineffectually refurbished.

In this sense, he recognized that the only serious contender for power in Europe was the new idealism of Bolshevism. The new German idealism on which German military might was to be based had to exert an appeal equal to if not stronger than Bolshevism.

Having thus diagnosed the world situation, he was guided by his intuition. Now his mind worked before put to the supreme test of thinking quickly in tight situations is shown by a conversation I had with him in October, 1932, on the airdrome at Hamburg. I asked him whether he had found any other, possibly more convincing reasons, for considering France decadent, than those outlined in "Mein Kampf." He looked at me rather quizzically as if he were being subjected to a leg-bull. Then apparently reassured, he replied: "Yes, the Maginot line." He paused to smile at my bewilderment and continued, "Whenever a people is so afraid to fight the barbarians (I interjected: "You mean the barbarians?" He replied, "Yes, I mean the barbarians.") that it builds a wall around itself to keep them out -- that nation is decadent. Look at the Roman lines in Southwest Germany, look at the Great Wall of China. These construction feats both marked the beginning of the downfall of great empires." In those far off days, he not only confessed his intention to smash France but he felt confident that France would fall without a fight, an opinion which he probably held until the Reynaud government came to power.

It is true that his analysis of the European situation in 1932 (and he made not the slightest effort at concealment) makes his conduct of the war more inexplicable. Having diagnosed the West as decadent and knowing that there would be little opposition to his assuming the role of a crusader to slay the monster of Bolshevism, his obvious intention was to strike eastwards in the spring of the year, overrun Poland and then strike at Russia, confident that France and Britain would not bother him with a two-front war. I am sure that such was his intention. Why he failed to carry

it out is difficult to tell.

Self-Discipline.

Hitler is fully conscious of his lowly origin, his lack of formal education, his shyness, his unsociability. After the last war, he literally manufactured himself into another man by sheer will power. He convinced himself that Germany had a future and that he could make himself the savior of his country. By "re-magnetizing his heart" and "getting religion" he made himself into a public speaker because he felt that the spoken word was much more potent than the written. Handicaps which he could not overcome were bent to his advantage. Not being a tall fellow well-met, he molded himself into what passes for a strong, silent mystical character. He always blushed when select groups of Nazi mothers rushed their little boys and girls at him with bouquets on the air-dromes. I never once saw him pat the bearers of these tokens on the head, ask their age or whether they went to school. He took the bouquets, usually wild or garden flowers, in his left hand, gave a limp salute with his right, and handed the flowers to the chief of his bodyguard, Schaub, who carried two revolvers under his raincoat.

His infinitely greater appeal to women than men was everywhere noticeable. Groups of women of all ages used to form flocks of guardian angels who watched over him all night in the lobbys of hotels while he slept somewhere above. In Flensburg in the summer of 1932 three flaxen-haired blue-eyed daughters of the three Nazi district leaders came to Brueckner,

the adjutant and chauffeur, begging for the chance of "kissing the Fuehrer in the eye." The Fuehrer consented and the girls and their escorts were ushered into Hitler's hotel room. They went in like little soldiers, de-filed just inside the room, and saluted and then fell Hitler. Hitler advanced from the other end of the room to stand in front of the squad, clicked his heels and saluted. There was an awkward, rather embarrassing pause (the procedure of kissing the Fuehrer in the eye) lasting about half a minute. Hitler saluted again and strode back to his desk. The girls saluted, cried "Heil Hitler" and then turned out of the room. Just outside they leaped up, threw their arms about Brueckner's neck, (he was six feet four) and kissed him all over the head. Their lips were moist, in fact they were almost frothing at the mouth, completely hysterical with joy. Inside the room not a single word was spoken other than Heil Hitler had been spoken. They did literally tremble but look the bashful Fuehrer in the eye and yet, as they said over and over again the moment would remain the greatest of their lives. Many naturally still are believed also to run deep. Brueckner's comment to the ladies was "The old man did that very well, don't you think?"

Hitler without doubt molded himself into the leader he thought would carry the people with him. And in the process he sought to avoid all distractions. He always went about as if wrapped in himself. He spoke little even to his bosom pals. A tip which worked amazingly came from Schaub before the first airplane tour. He advised us never to ask the Fuehrer more than one or two questions at a time and never to bother him unless time seemed heavy on his hands. The questions should be challenging

in order to make him lose himself in an oration. He was no good at argumentation. In fact, Hitler was an extremely easy person to know well. I once wrote an 800-word interview, discretely worded but containing what I thought were the aims and ultimate purposes of the Nazi movement -- European domination. He sent the interview back with a note of apology for changing one word.

Asceticism

Much has been written concerning Hitler's being a teetotaler, a non-smoker and a vegetarian. He at that time slept not more than four or five hours a night, ate sparingly and seemed to live on his nerves, or better said, on his spirit. Flying frightened him yet he put up with it because it was the only way he could get around quickly to all the out-of-the-way corners of Germany. He couldn't bear to look down out of the windows and always sat in the middle because he thought it safest. On these tours he spoke an average of five times a day, a total of at least six hours. His lunch, usually at an airframe restaurant, consisted of two slices of buttered bread and a glass of milk. Since he ate in ten minutes, all other members of the party had to stuff their pockets with sandwiches.

At lunchtime in Kiel in August, 1932, the local Nazis presented the party with a small wooden case of smoked spratts. The ever-hungry Brueckner lost no time prying open the lid as the airplane was taking off. He handed the box first to Hitler. The Fuehrer peered at the artistically-arranged fish and asked what they were. Brueckner assured him that the fish were the original famous Kieler Sprotten. "How am I supposed to eat them?" Hitler asked. "Why," gasped the astonished Brueckner, "you take one

of the wooden forks on top, spear a fish and eat it." Hitler's face turned positively green. "You mean to suggest," he said, "that I am to eat head, tails and entrails of these things?" "Of course," laughed Brueckner, "they are considered a great delicacy in these parts." Hitler shook his head and passed the box back to me.

Hitler's aversion to the smell of tobacco was so intense that nobody was allowed to smoke in any room he might perchance enter. If there was a wait on airdrotes, Press Chief Dietrich used to lead me off by the arm, away from the main group as if he wanted a few confidential words. Several hundred yards away he drew out his cigaret case and offered me a smoke. If the wind was in Hitler's direction, we moved round. In the beer cellar of the Brown House in Munich, hearing Prussian election returns one Sunday night, in the fall of 1932, Hitler noticed that many of the same people went out every hour or so. He asked why. Goebbels assured the Fuehrer that they went to the toilet. Actually they went for a smoke.

If he was a celibate, as all the members of his entourage averred, it was, I should say, because he never gave women a thought. Women were a distraction. In his youth he was most likely too shy to go out with girls, and in his manhood he was far too busy. Neither was he homosexual.

Nothing demonstrated the duality of his person — the character self-made for the people to follow and the grown-up boy who just couldn't fit into society — better than his relations with his entourage, that is to say, with about fifty members of the "old guard" from Hess and Goering and Rosenberg down to his bodyguard and chauffeur. To them he very wisely never attempted to play the role of the God-sent savior. He always assumed that they knew the game that he was playing and had to play to gain

power. His attitude towards them was comradely, rarely convivial. He never seemed to trust any one of them implicitly. He knew that they were an inchoate group of thugs, gangsters and high-minded idealists, each of whom he exploited for the benefit of the cause because he felt he needed thugs to kill the opposition and idealists to win over the meek. Each one of them was pigeon-holed in his mind for a particular job. He picked them for a particular purpose, they swore an oath of personal allegiance to him and if they did their jobs well they remained. Murder and robbery were not evils in themselves. The cause counted. Personal likes and dislikes were never taken into consideration. He didn't care for friendship; he wanted loyalty and ability. Nor did he like "flunkies." Palsome praise to his face from one of his followers would have made him suspicious. If they praised him as the son of God to the masses, that was another matter, but even then he never bothered so much about what they said as about its effectiveness -- whether the people believed it.

In conference Hitler always respected others' superior specialized knowledge, technical training or education. If, for example, his pilot said that weather reports were unfavorable and a flight would be dangerous, Hitler never insisted on taking off. Formal conferences on matters of policy or tactics were at times exceedingly stormy. But Hitler held his tongue until rivals had argued themselves out and the participants became rather bored. Then he had the last word, not in any oracular sense but as an impartial judge who had listened to all the arguments. As likely as not

- 2 -

he would say, "Let's come back to this subject another time." He seemed oblivious to incessant intrigues between individuals and groups. Possibly he affected this aloofness in order to remain unsullied. He never seemed to bother about personal matters so long as they did not take the form of a conspiracy against him or against the party. He seemed to have no particular favorite, though he undoubtedly listened more to the advice of some. But his bond was with individuals who had given him their word of blind obedience, and he held all these strings in his own hand. He never presumed to be more than the initiator, setting high policy and strategy, especially in the sphere of foreign and domestic politics.

The attitude of his followers towards him was remote from hero worship or religious adoration. They had staked their fortunes and future on his success and they believed that his gifts would lead the party to power in Germany and Germany to power in the world. Their faith in victory was at times sorely tried as in August 1932, after Hindenburg for the first time had refused to appoint Hitler chancellor and Hitler refused the demand of Roehm and others for a coup d'etat. His followers were always cynical about the circuses and fireworks of giant mass meetings. They never seemed impressed by Hitler's speeches, except in the sense of the speeches being effective or ineffective. The talk after a meeting always concerned its success or failure -- size of the crowd, enthusiasm, number of persons who fainted, whether Hitler put over well this or that point, what line of argument seemed to create the deepest impression, number of flags, uniformed detachments, the liveliness of the military band, etc.

Brueckner used to time on his watch the moment "the holy ghost would enter Hitler's body." He meant the time when Hitler would begin shout-

ing and gesticulating after a rather slow and hushed beginning. Brueckner said the time averaged about three minutes from the beginning of the speech.

Once Brueckner, seated on the platform, showed me his watch at the moment Hitler began speaking and asked me to note the time. About three and one-half minutes later Brueckner nudged me. Hitler had pushed both hands, fingers extended, upwards along the side of his head and started bellowing for reasons wholly unrelated to the context of his speech. "See, " whispered Brueckner, "the holy ghost has taken hold of him." That was also the moment when men and women began to faint and were carried off by stormtroop stretcher bearers.

Hitler always seemed pleased at the plaudits of the crowd but never without smirking as if to say, "the poor shees are being taken in." He despised the masses as so many sheep. They have always in his mind been led for causes almost always profane, but whatever the cause the leader must never forget to impress upon the masses that God has thus commanded and moulded him in His image, though the truth be the reverse. The secret of Hitler is found not in him but in history.

February 1943

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Col. William J. Donovan

DATE: March 3, 1943

FROM: Dr. Walter C. Langer

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Hitler's Proclamation to the National Socialist Party on the Anniversary of its Founding February 24, 1943

A psychoanalytical study of Hitler's Proclamation is scarcely feasible due to the fact that it was prepared in advance and read by another person. Furthermore, we have no way of knowing what Hitler actually said in this Proclamation. We have three versions at our disposal: (a) the short wave trans-ocean broadcast reported by AP appearing in the New York Times, Feb. 25, 1943; (b) long wave broadcasts in German from Oslo, presumably intended for the German troops in the Northern area; and (c) the Berlin press version broadcast on short wave in Morse code over DNB.

No two of these versions agree with each other, although the core of each is fundamentally the same. Obviously, the original proclamation was severely edited and whole paragraphs deleted. The AP version contains the essential core but due to the omitted paragraphs it seems, at first glance, like a jumble of disconnected thoughts. It is safe to assume that the original was not disjunctive and that the editing of the different versions was done with a definite goal in view. It is barely possible that the editing in the English version was designed to create the impression that

*Hitler, Adolf 10, 11, 73
Proclamation 2/24
Nazi Party
Germany*

March 8, 1943

Hitler's mental condition is far more serious than it is in reality. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why some of the paragraphs appearing in the German versions should be omitted since they contain no incriminating material.

Even the Berlin press version, the longest and most complete of the three, shows a great many signs of tampering. In fact, it is far more difficult to understand the disparities between the two German versions than between either of these and the English. Perhaps the aim underlying the editing can best be illustrated by an examination of the same paragraph as it appeared in the three different versions.

Berlin Press
version

Then, in 1920, I announced in this hall the Party program and the decision to annihilate the enemies of our people, with all the fanaticism of which we were capable, I was a lonely and unknown man. Germany, however, was going through her deepest humiliation. The number of those who believed in her revival was negligible. The people who hoped for this to happen within our lifetime were fewer still. The few followers who adhered to me at that time were faced by an almost crushing enemy superiority. For each 100 National Socialists, there were many millions of enemies, partly misguided, partly filled with hatred, not counting those of little faith who always wait for success before they bravely march alongside the victorious party.

Oslo version

Welch ein Unterschied gegenueber dem Kampf von Heute! Denn wie gross auch die Koalition unserer Feinde sein mag, sie ist als Macht geringer als die Kraft des Buendnisses der Voelker die sich der bolschewistisch-plutokratischen Vernichtung entgegenwerfen

AP version

The party has always been imbued with unbendable determination not to capitulate in any circumstances and not give up the struggle in any case before the conspiracy of our enemies has been snapped off at its core and been eliminated.

March 8, 1943

Throughout the Berlin press version there is a great deal about the Party, its lowly beginnings, its loyalties and its undying devotion to Hitler. Interestingly enough, there is very little said about the Bolshevist menace on the Eastern front. The great enemy of Germany and the world in general is, as it was from the first days of the National Socialist Party, the Jew. The big difference is that now the Jew has allied himself with the Bolsheviks and the democracies: "The same joint front of enemies we had to face in Germany now faces us again as an alliance between Jewish bankers of New York, the Jewish plutocratic ruling caste of London and the Jews in Moscow's Kremlin." Furthermore, "Above all, this war demonstrates incontrovertibly the complete identity of plutocracy and Bolshevism, as well as the eternal unchanging aim of all Jews which is to despoil nations and convert them into slaves."

In both of the German versions he has much more to say about the Jewish menace than is included in the AP text. He is liberal in his prophecies and as the war goes on, one nation after another will realize the Jewish menace and "just as the German people, realizing this danger, successfully fought the Jewish enemy at home and is now about to finish them off once and for all, just so other nations will become increasingly conscious of their true selves as the war goes on and will finally make common cause against the race which works for the destruction of them all."

Just as the Jew has always been responsible for all of Germany's misfortunes, so he is now responsible for the present war and the

March 8, 1943

miseries of the German people. This is the whip Hitler has always used to arouse the German people to action and it is difficult to escape the impression that coming in this form at the present time can only mean new pogroms. In another place, the Berlin version says "For, thank Heaven, not only the Jews in London and New York have unambiguously stated what Fate has primarily intended for the German people; those in Moscow have done so, too. But we are determined to give them a no less clear reply."

If this impression is correct, it seems safe to assume that resentments within Germany are rising to a threatening degree. An examination of the past will reveal that terror against the Jews almost invariably follows a period of rising discontent within Germany. It is the old technique of redirecting aggressive impulses away from yourself to some scapegoat against which they can find unlimited expression.

All of the material against the Jews is contained in identical form in the Oslo version. However, much of the material pertaining to the Party is completely omitted. In place of it, we find grim determination and assurances that Germany is stronger and that German might is still superior. It is interesting, for example, that the Berlin version omits completely the following paragraph:

"As in the period of my struggle for power, every onslaught of our enemies and every one of their apparent successes made me grit my teeth even more firmly and become more determined never to stray from the way which leads sooner or later to my aim. Today, too, I am inspired by the same will-power to resolve to the last consequence the task which fate has entrusted to me."

March 8, 1943

In the English version, the frequent references to the Party are also omitted, as well as any personal references such as: "I, an unknown man, could not have started from this hall on my way through all obstacles." Rather, there is an attempt to create an impression of solidarity and determination, together with the paragraph on fanaticism which he has taught the people which does not appear in the Berlin version. Together with the aforementioned disjunctivity, one might suppose that the propagandists were trying to present him as an insane individual with a fixed determination never to yield and who is prepared to loose all kinds of terror. The Berlin version, on the other hand, tries to create the impression of the great leader who almost single-handed has guided his people away from destruction and that the present crisis is only one more obstacle in the road to ultimate success. Inasmuch as he has overcome many similar obstacles in the past, he is entitled to their loyalty in his present struggle and they can help him by wreaking vengeance on his enemies who are close at hand, namely, the saboteurs and the Jews.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

August 4, 1943

To: Dr. James Grafton Rogers
From: Robert H. Knapp *R.H.K.*
Subject: Attached Suggestion Re: Hitler

We should like to have the attached proposal of Mr. Warner approved.

It is the hope of the campaign to make Hitler an object of ridicule and to call his sanity into question.

attachment

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: MOPO Committee

FROM: Eugene P. Warner

SUBJECT: Hitler Taking Dancing Lessons

DATE: August 3, 1943

This will be a series of picture postcards, to be kept in a deck, like a deck of cards.

1. Shows a fake news clipping in German stating that because of war strain Hitler's doctor has ordered more exercise and der Fuehrer has decided on dancing as the most practical exercise.
2. Faked picture of Hitler being instructed in folk dance by a male teacher. Both are smiling gayly.
3. Faked picture of Hitler dancing with children.
4. Faked picture of Hitler dancing with a fat frau. He is kicking up his heels in wild abandon and laughing joyously.
5. Faked picture of Hitler doing dance in his office. German generals stand in background scowling.
6. Faked picture of Hitler dancing in Goebbel's back yard. Goebbels' children applauding. Goebbels frowns. (A newsphoto recently appeared of Goebbels children.)
7. Faked picture of Hitler in male ballet costume in exotic pose.

A.K.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

TO: ✓ Lt. Dolan
Mr. Cushing

DATE: September 6, 1943

FROM: Lt. D. V. McGranahan

SUBJECT: "Heel" Campaign

Here is the revised edition of the anti-Hitler ("Heel") campaign.

What next?

It has been agreed by the various German experts of OSS that the time is now ripe for an intensive MO campaign against Hitler. The aim of the campaign is to undermine German respect for Hitler and to widen the cleavage between him and other power elements in Germany.

To achieve this goal, certain main lines of attack have been decided upon. These lines of attack follow, and under each is listed a series of implementing ideas. MO will undertake to spread these ideas through rumors and through other concrete operations suggested in the appendix.

1. To destroy the Hitler myth and bring der Führer down to the level of an ordinary party leader. To do this we must stress the human failings and foibles of der Führer.

Suggested Implementation:

a. In spite of the great paper shortage, Hitler has refused to eliminate compulsory purchases of Mein Kampf by newly married couples, etc. Hitler prefers to keep his 40% royalties, war or no war.

b. Hitler personally profited at the rate of 1 RM for every kilometer of road built in Germany during the 30's.

c. The available paper supply and printing facilities in Germany have been increasingly absorbed by Mein Kampf and other Party publications. Hitler and the Party leaders have thus succeeded in maintaining their private incomes from these sources, although German students must do without textbooks, and great newspapers like the Frankfurter Zeitung must be suspended.

d. Hitler is terrified by air-raids and has, therefore, never visited an area which has just been bombed and is apt to be bombed again.

e. Hitler rejects pleas from Goebbels that he visit areas devastated by Allied raids. He does not have the courage to face the people.

f. A Parisian connoisseur, after seeing Hitler's collection of pornographic pictures, stated that it was the best in Europe.

g. Hitler has a special plane bringing him asparagus and bon-bons fresh daily from Paris.

h. Hitler now has five luxurious country estates which he visits in rotation so that he will not appear to be spending too much time in any one of them.

1. Hitler has refused to confer with his generals since the time they unbraided him for his Wagnerian conception of military strategy. He issues grandiose commands from his private headquarters, but the generals pay little attention to them.

2. To picture Hitler as utterly unsympathetic toward the loss of life and the suffering of the individual German.

Suggested Implementation:

a. Hitler has declared, "I will not stop fighting until 10,000,000 Germans have died." 4 million have gone - 6 million to go.

b. Hitler declares that it is better for the whole German nation to die as a race of heroes on the battlefield than to abandon the ideals of the greater Reich.

c. Hitler has determined that the German people must share his personal fate - victory or destruction. Because honorable defeat is not possible for him, he will not permit it for Germany, but insists that the whole nation be utterly destroyed with him if he falls.

d. Hitler believes that air-raids are racially beneficial because they weed out the incompetents who cannot save themselves and the biological weaklings who break under the strain.

e. Hitler knew that the British and American air-raids were coming, but refused to make effective preparations because he believed that suffering from air-raids would stiffen the morale of the home front.

f. Hitler has ordered that air-raid victims who have been maimed and crippled be done away with by euthanasia. Also, old people who cannot stand the shock of air-raids and make a public nuisance of themselves.

g. Hitler will fight until the next-to-the-last German, and only then will sue for peace.

h. The total number of German casualties has never been revealed by Hitler. Civilians should demand the truth.

3. To spread the view that Hitler has gone insane.

Suggested Implementation:

a. Hitler's creeping paralysis ("progressive paralyse") due to syphilitic infection

in the last war has now reached his speaking organs and his brain. When der Führer tried to rehearse a recent speech, it was discovered that he could not control his voice. Neither could he keep to the prepared text, but went off into wild and incoherent ramblings.

b. Hitler now raves that he will take a plane and follow Hess to England to argue the British out of the war. He is being closely guarded and will not be given access to a plane while his mind is still unbalanced.

c. Hitler hears voices every night and insists that Roehm is talking to him.

d. Hitler's insanity is now in the catatonic phase - he sits and stares all day long and has to be fed forcibly.

e. Dr. Jung, the Swiss psychiatrist, has washed his hands of Hitler's case.

f. The insulin shock treatment for insanity is being used on Hitler in order to restore his mind sufficiently so that he can make a speech

g. Hitler now goes around all day dressed as Frederic the Great. He insisted on calling Goebbels Voltaire when the latter tried to approach him recently on a matter of state.

h. Hitler is now told only favorable news. His doctors fear a complete collapse should he be told the truth of Germany's situation.

i. Hitler now works out all his military strategy through star-gazing and occultism. He passes on his decisions to the generals who listen to him, promise they will do as he says and later report success. Actually, however, they pay no attention to the Führer whatsoever.

j. Hitler keeps two Jewish-Gypsy soothsayers with him at Berchtesgaden all the time.

k. Hitler has spent the last month designing a stupendous mausoleum for himself.

l. Hitler has such delusions of persecution that he refuses to see anyone but his personal body guards, lives in a room without windows, and has his food tested before eating it.

m. At his last meeting with Himmler, Hitler screamed that even the SS had turned against him and were plotting against his life.

4. To spread the view that Hitler himself has completely lost faith in German victory.

Suggested Implementation:

- a. Hitler staged a suicide attempt on September 3 by running a sword into his side. However, he missed hitting any vital organ and is well on the way to recovery.
- b. Hitler refused to involve Spain in the war because he has a promise of sanctuary there when Germany is defeated.
- c. Planes are kept ready at both Munich and Berlin air-ports for Hitler to flee the country. A special gasoline-carrying plane will allow the fugitives to make only one stop before reaching Japan.
- d. Hitler grew furious when he read Roosevelt's note requesting neutral governments not to give asylum to Nazi leaders. Roosevelt apparently knew that Hitler and Goering were negotiating with both Spain and Turkey at the time.
- e. Mussolini sent Hitler a post card from his island prison: "Having a lovely time. Bet you wish you were here." Hitler has confessed his envy of Mussolini.

5. To persuade left-wing National Socialists that Hitler has betrayed the socialist line.

Suggested Implementation:

- a. For the last six months, Hitler has personally refused to speak or have anything to do with labor representatives. He insists that the "masses" approach him through the proper intermediaries.
- b. Hitler's cronies who visit and feast with him at his retreats are now only industrialists and Junkers (names).
- c. Hitler has taken up drinking French champagne and wears a monocle when at private parties with his industrialist and Junker friends. His clothes are all fashioned by a Parisian tailor.
- d. Hitler is now pleased with the thought that he is socially acceptable.
- e. Hitler agreed with the industrialists to use foreign laborers in Germany as a weapon to break the power of German labor and reduce their standard of living.

f. The growing monopolistic control of Germany economy is the result of a plan evolved by Hitler in 1935.

g. To spread the view that the Army and the industrialists have sold Germany down the river, and to create a demand that Hitler be given absolute and complete control of the German military and economic machine.

a. The Herrenklub is now running Germany, ("die feine Herren sind wieder da"), The Junkers, the industrialists and the SS have stabbed Germany in the back. Roehm was right. Hitler admits it now.

b. It is the timorous Junker generals, not Hitler, who made the colossal strategic errors, and are still doing so. If the generals had not refused to invade England in 1940 when Hitler wanted to, the war would now be over. Likewise, Russia would now be shattered if the generals had not got cold feet in the drive to Moscow. Let the Führer run the war, not the monocled, spiritless generals.

c. Hitler is being kept a virtual prisoner by the SS and the Junkers. His recent attempts to revitalize the SA were quickly blocked.

PSF Safe
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OSS

*See
Secret*

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a statement made by Abram Hewitt, whom I think you know. He was in Sweden for some time and these notes represent a meeting with Dr. Kersten, attending physician of Himmler, and the efforts of Kersten to induce Hewitt to go to Germany.

We have told Hewitt that he should not do this as I assumed you would not care to have Americans in Germany on such a basis.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

a54C01

CONTACT WITH HIMMLER

I. Background

What follows can best be understood in the light of the general Swedish position and the organization of Swedish economy. While in a political sense the Swedes are freedom-loving people and consequently more than 90% pro-United Nations, there is in Sweden a very deep seated fear and distrust of Russia and the motives of the existing Russian government. The Swedes, therefore, being a small nation, are looking for a counter-weight to Russia after the war. They believe that the only effective counter-weight for them is Germany. On this account and due to the fact that a very big proportion of Swedish foreign trade is conducted with Germany and that there are very heavy Swedish investments in Germany, the Swedes are anxious that Germany should not be totally destroyed. In fact, the Swedes would like to see the war brought to an end with the least possible destruction of Germany.

Swedish economy is organized in three general blocks: (a) Government monopolies, including railroads, telephones, telegraphs, electric power, alcohol and

a54c02

tobacco; (b) Cooperatives covering a large percentage of consumers' goods, such as flour mills, groceries, etc.; and (c) Private banking, mining and manufacturing. This last field is largely dominated by organizations controlled by Enskilda Banken. This bank is controlled and managed by the Wallenberg family who have been bankers for a long time and whose foreign connections are the most important and extensive of any group in Sweden.

The present managing director of the bank is Jakob Wallenberg, who is a bachelor about 54 years old. He is responsible for the business of the bank dealing with the European continent, including Germany. His younger brother, Marcus Wallenberg, is responsible for the business of the bank dealing with the English-speaking world and South America.

Jakob Wallenberg is the permanent negotiator of the Swedish government with the German government in matters pertaining to trading agreements, barter, etc. In this position he has frequent contacts with the German government and visits Germany about four or five times a year. In his private capacity as a leading banker, he is in touch with a cross-section of the high ranking German

a54c03

financial and manufacturing interests.

I had known Jakob Wallenberg in 1932 when I was in Stockholm representing a trustee in bankruptcy of the International Match Corporation, the American holding company for the Ivar Kreuger interests. As a result of reorganization of the Kreuger interests, the Wallenberg's took over control of the Swedish Match Company and International Match Corporation, including their subsidiaries throughout the world. When I first saw Wallenberg in August 1943, he indicated that cells were forming in Germany for the purpose of overthrowing Hitler and he asked me if I would be willing to meet with representatives of these cells. I reported this fact at once to the American Minister in Stockholm, Mr. Herschel Johnson. He cabled the State Department at once, but no answer was received in Stockholm. At the end of this first interview with Wallenberg, he stated that his friends in Germany were somewhat perplexed about Himmler's true motives. While he was supposed to be entirely loyal to Hitler, certain changes were taking place in Germany which could only raise ques-

25404

tions in the minds of intelligent observers. Wallenberg's statement was made in vague terms of this sort. I took it to mean that there was some question as to Himmler's intention, eventually to oust Hitler and to take over the government himself.

Shortly after this conversation, Himmler was appointed Minister of the Interior, continuing to hold his other posts as Chief of the Gestapo and Chief of the SS. After about three months had gone by, I called Wallenberg's attention to the fact that nothing more had been heard of his proposal that I should meet with representatives of the cells organizing in Germany to overthrow Hitler. I asked if this meant that, following his appointment as Minister of the Interior, Himmler had succeeded in liquidating all of these cells, and that there was no longer in Germany any underground movement or group of cells worth talking about. Wallenberg confirmed that this was true, saying that, so far as he knew, there was no longer any organized resistance to the Nazis in Germany.

He gave it as his opinion that the only alterna-

a54c05

tives to Hitler in Germany were (a) the army, and (b) Himmler. He stated that communications between high army officers were under the control and supervision of Himmler's men; that whenever an army cell began to form which was hostile to Hitler, Himmler let it form until he was sure he knew who all the members were. These officers were then relieved of their commands. This statement of Himmler's relations with the army and his control of communications between the officers was confirmed to me by two other Swedes, who were very well informed about existing conditions in Germany.

Wallenberg's statement that the only alternatives to Hitler were (a) the army, and (b) Himmler, was confirmed by every well informed Swede I knew who discussed the matter with me.

Wallenberg's statements were further confirmed ... by the fact that the Swedes, outside their official legation and consulate, had built their government connections in Germany largely around Himmler and his organization.

The Swedes coming out of Germany reported that nearly everyone in Germany thought that Germany could not

a54c06

win the war. However, they did not feel that their position was hopeless and would continue to fight. Their hopes were based on (1) a successful resistance to the Russians after shortening their line somewhere about the German border; (2) that they would be able to repulse the invasion launched from England; and (3) the devastating effects of their so-called "secret weapon" when used. The gossip in Germany was that this weapon would only be used when the invasion from England was launched.

Finally, all Swedes informed about Germany agreed in reporting that the doctrine of "unconditional surrender", announced by the United Nations, had resulted in uniting everyone in Germany behind Hitler at a time when the hardships of the war and the natural forces of disintegration would otherwise be disrupting Germany.

II. Dr. Kersten

In view of the foregoing, I was not surprised when about the beginning of October 1943 during a call at the office of a very close friend of mine, who was one of the key men in the Wallenberg organization, he handed me a card which read, "Dr. Felix Kersten, Medecinolrad". My

a58C07

friend explained that this was the highest Finnish medical title, there being only three living men who hold it. He explained that while he himself was not acquainted with the doctor personally, he did know that he was one of the most powerful men in Germany. He went on to say that seven Swedish engineers employed by the Swedish Match Subsidiary in Poland had been caught and convicted of working with the Polish Underground. The Director of the Swedish Match Monopoly in Germany, Alva Moller, a mutual friend of ours, had gone to the doctor with a plea to have the death sentence of the Swedish engineers commuted, and this had been done. In addition, the doctor had arranged for two Dutch children, the son and daughter of the former Dutch Minister to Italy, to be given safe conduct through Germany to join their sister in Sweden. This had been done without delay, and I saw the children myself to verify this account. They did not, of course, know who had arranged for their passage but I did verify that they had been trying to get out of Switzerland for more than three years without success.

Since the doctor was renowned as a nerve specialist, an appointment was arranged for him to examine me on

a54c08

the pretext that I had vertebrae in my back which were causing me pain. The meeting took place and I found that the doctor spoke Finnish, Russian, Dutch and German but no English. All conversations between us took place in German. The doctor agreed to give me a course of treatment which he said would extend for about six weeks. This he did, giving me a manual therapy treatment which was designed to get blood into the nerves. The treatment was very painful and lasted for about an hour each day except Sundays.

During the course of these treatments the doctor told me about his life, as follows:

He had been a very poor boy in Finland and had suffered considerable hardships in order to complete his medical education. The development of this manual therapy treatment through the nervous system was entirely his own work. His practice had grown until, in 1928, he was called into consultation by the Court in Holland to examine Henry, the Prince Consort. He gave the Prince a course of manual therapy which was so successful that he was retained to become the "Leibarzt" to the Prince. He settled in The

05409

Hague where he remained except for trips to Italy where he treated Mussolini, Ciano and other high Italian government officials, and also members and officials of the Rumanian court and government.

In 1938, he had treated Himmler with great success. The result was that, when the Germans overran Holland in 1940, the Gestapo notified him that they would not be responsible for the safety of his family or himself unless he moved to Berlin. This he did in 1941. He showed me a Gestapo paper requiring him to move. His purpose in showing this paper probably was to try to persuade me that his removal to Berlin was not voluntary.

He became "Leibarzt" to Himmler and was retained by the SS organization to treat 21 of their officials each year. This required him to spend a great deal of his time at SS Headquarters. His contract provided for a salary of 60,000 marks a year, and he was given six times the normal gasoline ration for doctors.

He explained his presence in Sweden by saying that Alva Moller had come to him and had offered him 100,000 Swedish kroner if he could succeed in persuading

a 54 c10

Himmler and Hitler to commute the sentence of death for the seven Swedish engineers. He reported that he had talked with Himmler several times and had interviewed Hitler two or three times as well on this matter. He stated that he had refused the offer of 100,000 kroner point blank.

When the death sentence was commuted, the Swedes, through Alva Moller, asked if there was not something they could do for him, and invited him to spend a two months' vacation in Sweden.

What I think happened was that he reported the offer of 100,000 kroner to Himmler, who told him to refuse it, but arranged to get the engineers' death sentences commuted. Himmler knew that the Swedes would have to offer the doctor something else besides money, and that there was very little else they could do except invite him for a visit to Sweden. Undoubtedly, it suited Himmler's purpose very well to have a representative in Stockholm who was not a German citizen, and a Finnish citizen would be much more able to establish contact with Americans.

During the course of six weeks' treatment, the

254c 11

doctor told me a good deal about Himmler. Himmler had started life as an agricultural student, and had remained throughout his life keenly interested in questions of race and heredity. He was fanatically anti-Russian, having a great fear of the consequences of the high Russian birth rate, and disliking the threatened mixture of Slav blood with German blood. On the other hand, he had a great liking for the Anglo-Saxons because of their similarity of blood and racial characteristics with the Germans. Himmler had stated repeatedly to the doctor what a pity it was that Germans had to fight Englishmen and Americans, who were phsycially so like the Germans.

Contrary to most members of the Gestapo, Himmler was completely honest. He lived on a salary of 36,000 marks a year, and had no interest in accumulating money. Furthermore, he was completely loyal to his wife, a woman some 10 years older than Himmler.

The doctor said that most of the ministers in the German government, such as Ley, were totally unimportant. Himmler's relations with Goebbels and Ribbentrop were very bad as there was acute jealousy on each side. I

a5#e12

gathered that Goering was no longer very important as a vital force in Germany, and hence did not count a great deal in Himmler's calculations one way or another.

Martin Bormann, on the other hand, had been put in by Himmler in the party chancery under Hess, and after Hess' imprisonment in England, Bormann had taken his place. So far as the doctor knew, Bormann was still a Himmler man. My Swedish friends had told me that the SS had been expanded enormously and they believed included 1,500,000 men as early as January 1943. The doctor reported that there were over 2,000,000 men in the SS in October 1943, and that about 600,000 more men were in the Gestapo, all under Himmler's control and command.

Himmler realized that Germany could not win the war. He was anxious to salvage as much as possible from the wreck and knew that the United Nations would not deal with Hitler on any conditions. I told the doctor that Himmler had a very bad press indeed, in both England and America, and that it was very doubtful whether the American or British governments would deal with Himmler on any terms.

a54c13

The doctor urged me to come to Germany to discuss Himmler's position with him, and to see whether a settlement might not be possible. He indicated clearly that, on certain conditions, Himmler was prepared to overthrow Hitler, and that he was the only man who had power to do so in Germany. I told him that I did not represent the American government, and that I did not even know what the current policies of the American government were, and that on this account, it would be pointless for me to talk with Himmler. The doctor then suggested that I return to Washington, familiarize myself with the position of the American government and come back to Europe.

He mentioned to me that Himmler was organizing his own government within the SS, and that his two chief advisors on foreign affairs were Ober Fuehrer Walter Schellenberg and Dr. Braun; that he would be glad to get one of these men to come to Stockholm to confirm what he had been saying to me. Within a couple of days, he told me that Schellenberg was in Stockholm and would like to see me.

a54c14

I saw Colonel Schellenberg twice and he confirmed everything that Dr. Kersten had been telling me. He also pressed me to come to Germany to talk with Himmler. I told him that I was by no means certain that there would be any point in my coming even at a later date, and that I might have trouble getting out of Stockholm due to the very tight priority situation on the British planes. He at once offered to put me out through Lisbon, giving me safe conduct through Germany and France. He suggested that, when I come back to Europe, I come back to Lisbon, as the Gestapo organization was very good there and was, in his opinion, very poor in Stockholm. He gave me the names of 2 of his men in Lisbon, Schroeder and Breisky, to get in touch with them. He said that they would have a German passport ready for me.

The doctor reported that Prince Wied, the German Minister to Stockholm, had come with a peace proposal from the Russians to SS Headquarters about the time of Stalingrand, and that von Papen had come with another one from Ankara in May 1943. The outlines of the proposals were that Germany should take about one-half the Baltic

a54c15

countries to the north of East Prussia; that Poland should be divided according to the 1939 lines; that Russia should demand the whole coast to the Black Sea, including the mouth of the Danube, and should go as far as Constantinople and Salonika, and should also have a port on the Adriatic. Ribbentrop and Goebbels had been in favor of accepting these proposals, while Himmler and Hitler were against them.

The Germans calculated that, if the Russians continued an all-out offensive, which they have in fact done, their reserves would be exhausted towards the end of April 1944, and that the Eastern Front might develop into a stale-mate in the summer of 1944.

The doctor also reported that British and American bombing of Germany was resulting in a very large increase in communism, as when people have their homes destroyed, as well as all their personal property, they are automatically thrown upon the state to provide them with everything they need.

Himmler's policy was that he intended to keep order in Germany under the existing government as long as

a54c16

possible, and was prepared to shoot 20 or 30 million Germans to do so. However, when the time came that he believed that further military resistance was futile, he intended to destroy all of the private property in the occupied countries and in Germany, in order to produce a mass wave of communism. He would then announce himself as a communist, and throw his lot in with the Russians. The Germans believed that, if it became necessary to do this, that with a superior technical ability and organizing capacity, they could succeed in dominating greater Russian population and obtaining control on the vast Russians resources.

I made no promises or comment to the doctor or the Colonel, beyond stating that I would try to get back to Washington and see that the matter was brought to the attention of the President.

While it is obvious that conferences with Himmler are loaded with potential dynamite, nevertheless, I believe that there are enormous possible advantages in such a trip:

1. A great deal could be learned about the

a54c17

German frame of mind, and the relations of the important Germans with each other. The weak links in their armor in a material, psychological and personal sense could be better explored in this way than in any other.

2. The possibilities of provoking a "putsch" or civil war in Germany could be explored at first hand. It is possible that this, if successful, might save hundreds of thousands of lives in connection with the coming invasion.

The disadvantage of such a trip would be the capital which the Germans could make out of it in their own press and radio. However, they are in a position to do that anyway if they choose to lie about it. An untruth is a consideration which has never yet weighed with them.

I hope that full consideration will be given to the possibilities of such a trip, and I am, of course, ready to discuss the matter and amplify this report in any way that is desired.

a54/c18

PSF Safe
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

W.S.S. Jordan
file
Confidential

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I give you below a report regarding the situation in Germany on March 1st. Our representative says the following:

"I reproduce this as received; the ideas are not mine, but come from a good source. The destruction in Berlin is enormous, but it is extraordinary to observe the fatalism with which the inhabitants accept the new situation. Thousands of persons live in the ruins, in cellars and in temporary shelters. At the beginning of the bombardment, there were many complaints. Now it seems the population is somewhat used to them. The common misfortune which all are sharing has the result that those who suffer are not openly complaining. The air bombardments have not caused any internal revolt. People are not any longer raising the question of who is responsible. The misery is so great and so general that it stifles reaction.

"Among persons above 40 years of age, i.e. those who have had knowledge of, or participated in, the war of 1914-18, there is a considerable proportion of anti-Hitler sentiment, even of defeatism. Persons of this generation are in open opposition to those of the generation which follows them, that is to say, those from 18 to 30

a5#201

years old, who are mostly out-and-out Nazis. Now there is coming along a third generation - the young people from 12 to 18, who are far from being devoted to the present regime. In a school in Wiesbaden recently, the scholars agreed among themselves to beat up any of their school comrades who gave the Hitler salute. This young generation is not communist, because it does not know what communism is, but it has in it the elements of anarchism."



William J. Donovan
Director

a54e02

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.*file
in
infidential*

20 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will note that in Hewitt's statement, he refers to Bormann as having obtained a strong position in Germany. Below is a brief biography of Bormann, which may give you some information not heretofore available:

Martin Bormann occupies at the present time a position as head of the Party Chancellery of the Nazi Party and is a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. He acts as the Deputy of the Fuhrer. He has been described both as the No. 2 and the No. 3 Nazi, and along with Himmler, Goring, and Goebbels is alleged to be the fourth member of the group designated to take over the control of Germany in the event of the death of Hitler. Press accounts in Sweden and elsewhere state that Bormann is the most important Nazi next to Hitler.

Life: Bormann, the son of a Lutheran farmer,

a54901

was born in Halberstadt on June 17, 1900. During the World War, he served in the artillery. After 1918, he became a student of agriculture and was appointed to manage an estate in Mecklenburg. He combined this work with activities in the Free Corps, as a member of the Ehrhardt Brigade and as section leader in the notorious Rossbach Brigade, terroristic military organizations which fought the Weimar Republic. In 1923, while still a member of the Rossbach group, he was convicted to committing a political murder and was sentenced to prison. After serving one year he was released. He immediately joined the Frontbann, as a racial para-military organization, and in 1925 became a member of the Nazi Party.

Position in Nazi Party: Bormann's rise to power was rapid in the Nazi Party. Two years after he joined the Party he became the Gau Press Chief (Gaupressobmann) in Thuringia. In 1928 he was appointed district leader and office manager (Bezirksleiter und Gaugeschaeftsfuehrer) in the Gau organization of Thuringia. In the same year he was made a member of the staff of the Supreme Command of the SA, a position

a54g02

which he held until 1930. He was also director of the Hilfskasse of the Nazi Party. In 1933, Bormann was made a member of the Reichstag and became Chief of Staff to the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Rudolf Hess (Stabsleiter des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers). Bormann worked with Hess in controlling Party affairs until the latter's flight to England. He holds the rank of Obergruppenfuhrer in both SS and SA, a Senior Group Leader.

After the flight of Hess, the office of Deputy Fuehrer remained vacant. A new office, Leader of the Party Chancellery (Leiter der Parteikanzlei) was created and Bormann was appointed to it. This office gives complete control over all Nazi Party affairs and the numerous party bureaucracy to him.

Political Position: The political viewpoint and position of Bormann in Nazi Germany has been made the subject of many rumors. He represents the SS group and since 1942, has purged many government officials, replacing them with SS men. He was reported to be associated with SS extremist factions. His closest friend is alleged

a54903

to be General Zeitzler, an ardent Nazi who rose to prominence in the German army after the defeat at Stalingrad. Cables from Bern in October 1943 state that Bormann was associated with Goring in sponsoring peace proposals to the Soviet Union and that he has quarrelled with von Ribbentrop over German foreign policy. In internal affairs, Bormann has advocated complete SS control in Germany. He represents the pagan group and has always shown a violent opposition to religion. His reputation as an ardent Nazi is not only demonstrated by his prominent position in the Party, but also by his record of violence and murder in politics which dates officially from the time he was nineteen years old.


William J. Donovan
Director

a54g04

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I know you will be interested in the following report which I have just received from my senior intelligence officer in the European Theater of Operations. The report is based on five days observation of major towns, lodgement area, and conferences with several corps and division commanders.

1. Military.

With rare exception, combat success, substantial leadership and morale of troops tops. Logistical support over beaches now surpassing schedule. Enemy divisions in North and Northwest reduced to about half strength. Civilian reports and prisoner interrogation indicate enemy troop morale low. Absence of Luftwaffe important factor. Our men who fought the German in Tunisia and Italy report him not as determined a fighter. Enemy equipment quality good especially electrical and mechanical

a55 K02

-2-

devices like Doodlebug but quantity, especially artillery, lacking.

2. Civilian and Political.

French still 50% apathetic because of shock, civilian casualties, and effects of four years of German rule. Isigny, Carentan and small coastal villages badly wrecked, but Bayeux untouched. Older people still admire Petain as their protector from Hitler. Many cannot understand previous Giraud-DeGaulle jockeying while Germans still in France. Normandy does not appear wildly pro-De Gaulle. People thawing out rapidly under influence of our GI's. No critical shortage in this rural section except for bread. Most French claim flour available for only three weeks.


William J. Donovan
Director

255 X 03

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: AUG 2000

W. & W. DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
APO 413, U. S. Army

6 December 1944

SUBJECT: MO Radio Project "PATRIOT"

TO : Director, Psychological Warfare Division, G-2

FROM : Chief, MO Branch, OSS-ETO

1. OBJECT: To create within the rank and file of the Wehrmacht and the junior officers, the belief that the home front on which their war effort depends, has once again failed them as in 1918, but this time because of the internecine fights for control between Goering and Hitler.

2. METHOD: The program presumes that Hitler, for whatever reason, is no longer an active factor in German politics. A faction of considerable strength, supporting Goering and by implication directed by him, comes on the air and calls for unity, patriotism and support of the war fronts. The cover is: The Goering group is sufficiently powerful to come on the air in the interests of unity, patriotism and devotion to Hitler and successful conclusion of the war.

3. SUBJECT MATTER:

A. The substance of the propaganda is urged through implication and leakage through the main expressed points: loyalty to Hitler's principles and the legend of the Fuehrer; unity within the party; complete support of the army in its battles with the enemy; the sacrifice of all personal and private party interests.

B. The essential propaganda line is never openly stated, but comes through by indirection as evidence of high echelon party struggles for control within Germany. This line is:

(1). Goering is maneuvering against Hitler to be in a position of superiority when and if defeat brings on the possibility of civil war within the Reich. Goering's preeminence will be the guarantee against such civil war.

(2). Goering built up the industrial potential of Germany and gained the confidence of the masses and industrial leaders during the process.

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

☐ Retain class. Change to _____
☐ Declassify in part and extent as shown
☒ Declassify ☐ After _____

EO 12958, 15X (M N)
☒ With concurrence of CIA (not authorized)
SPS/CRIR by gma Date 7/20/99

(3). Goering used the airforce against England as a preliminary softening up process for invasion. The conservation of the German navy prevented the successful conclusion of the war there and then as Great Britain has openly admitted. Thereafter, Goering advised against use of the airforce as a terror weapon in order to safeguard the German cities. It was Himmler etc, who advised the use and development of terror weapons, because Goering refused and still refuses to use the air force on anything but the actual military defense of Germany. It was Himmler who caused the present massive assaults on German domestic targets.

(4). Goering supported Hitler in the leader's first fight against party opportunists such as Roehm and Strasser, and today supports Hitler against the much more dangerous enemy, Himmler.

(5). Goering was individually approached in 1939 to make peace and take over leadership of the Reich. Out of loyalty to Hitler he revealed the plan to the Fuehrer. But Goering still is the only party official who could play any patriotic role for peace when and if the Wehrmacht desires it with the full consent of the German masses. Himmler is a police bully and spy, a murderer and torturer with whom no sane man would deal.

(6). Goering can save something from the present crisis, if the party is united around him and his calm reasonableness which is opposed to the war criminal clique led by Himmler.

(7). Stable, sober forces within the Reich have approached Goering and asked him to take over the position which Hitler delegated to him.

(8). Goering stands for army control by army generals and not Himmler opportunists masquerading as military men. He invites army support as the one coherent, traditional German force which stands between the German nation and chaos whether in victory or defeat.

4. TARGET: Gettable. The Himmler led faction which through spreading police and party controls is gaining power in the Reich as against the older, loyal and devoted National Socialists, of whom Goering is the leader and designated head through Hitler.

5. TRANSMISSION: Most powerful medium wave available.

6. DURATION: Once a week, depending on military situation and intelligence from within Germany. At least three or four speeches and possibly more.

SECRET

ITEM	PRINCE PROGRAM
	INSTRUMENT
	STORY
PHYS	PREPARE FOR TRAVEL
ITEM	TRAVEL
	CODE NO. (2, 3, 4)
	TRAVEL REST. CODE
	CASSE NO. (11)
	REG (6)
EX-105	FOR TRAVEL

S.F.E.

Mr. Eric W. Staight

Ronald Carroll

December 7, 1944

Information on Adolf Hitler and on the murder of Gregor Strasser

In the course of an interview on December 7, 1964 on another topic, Mr. Hans Bie (#N 449) gave the following information. Although I was informed that some staff members of the F.E.A. have doubts of Subject's reliability and believe him to have a tendency to exaggerate, I am passing this information along as it was given with an air of sincerity and truthfulness and seems entirely plausible.

PROFESSOR SAUERBRUCH'S OPINION OF HITLER

Prof. Ferdinand Sauerbruch, the eminent professor of surgery of Barlin University and personal physician to Adolf Hitler, was closely connected with the research department of the Schering A. S. which, in cooperation with him, conducted cancer research. In January, 1937, at a party given to celebrate Subject's fortieth anniversary with the Schering Concern, Subject and Prof. Sauerbruch in the course of a private conversation discussed Adolf Hitler. Prof. Sauerbruch then stated that from close observation of Hitler for many years, he had formed the opinion that the Nazi leader was a border case between genius and insanity and that in his opinion the decision would take place in the near future whether Hitler's mind would swing towards the latter. Prof. Sauerbruch then said that should the latter occur, Hitler would become "the craziest criminal the world ever saw".

In April, 1937 when Prof. Sauerbruch and Subject again met, Prof. Sauerbruch stated that in his opinion the swing towards insanity had taken place and that the first symptom was the dismissal of the moderate members of Hitler's government such as Dr. Schacht, that Hitler was completely under the influence of criminals like Himmler, Goebbels and Ley and that Germany was doomed. On Subject's question what he expected Hitler's end to be, Prof. Sauerbruch predicted that the Nazi leader either would have a "romantic end", meaning some kind of "Goetterdaemmerung" like suicide on his mountain retreat near Berchtesgaden, or would die in an insane asylum.

retreat
asylum.

RECORD COPY

201-93533

- 2 -

December 7, 1944

HITLER'S THROAT OPERATION

In 1935 a throat operation was performed on Hitler by Prof. Carl von Eicken, the ear, nose and throat specialist of Berlin University. Subject, however, did not know any details about the operation.

GREGOR STRASSER'S MURDER

Gregor Strasser, who until December 1932, when he was replaced by Robert Ley, was chief organizer of the Nazi Party and as such was surpassed in importance in the party organization only by Hitler, in April 1933 was elected in the "Vorstand" of Schering. His specific functions there were labor relations and in particular contact with the Nazi labor union, the Deutsche Arbeits Front.

As is commonly known, Gregor Strasser was liquidated in the Nazi blood purge of June, 1934. The official version then given out by the Nazis was that Strasser was arrested and had committed suicide in his cell. From Strasser's widow, however, Subject was told that Strasser was shot through the back of the head, a wound he could not have inflicted himself.

Settlement of the Strasser estate was entrusted to Subject and Dr. Carlos Wetzel, a member of the "Vorstand" of Schering. The most important asset of the Strasser estate was a life insurance policy for RM 20,000 issued by the Allianz & Stuttgarter Lebensversicherungsbank A.G. This policy, however, contained a clause that no payment should be made if death of the insured occurred through suicide. In view of this clause and of the official version of Strasser's death, the insurance company refused payment. To help Strasser's widow the services of Dr. Georg Eschstruth, a well-known Berlin attorney with much influence in the Nazi party and a fraternity brother of Dr. Hans Berckmeyer, chairman of the board of Schering, was engaged. Dr. Eschstruth submitted the case to Hitler who made the following decision:

1. The insurance company was ordered to pay the RM 20,000 to Strasser's widow.
2. The insurance company was reimbursed with this amount by the Nazi Party.
3. Strasser's children, then 11 and 12 years respectively, whose godfather Hitler was, were each to receive RM 6,000 per year from Nazi Party funds until they reached the age of 18.

R. C.

201-93533

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 36822By CO NARA Date 9-30-84

- 8 -

December 7, 1944

HITLER'S THROAT OPERATION

In 1935 a throat operation was performed on Hitler by Prof. Carl von Eicken, the ear, nose and throat specialist of Berlin University. Subject, however, did not know any details about the operation.

GREGOR STRASSER'S MURDER

Gregor Strasser, who until December 1932, when he was replaced by Robert Ley, was chief organizer of the Nazi Party and as such was surpassed in importance in the party organization only by Hitler, in April 1933 was elected in the "Vorstand" of Soehring. His specific functions there were labor relations and in particular contact with the Nazi labor union, the Deutsche Arbeitsfront.

As is commonly known, Gregor Strasser was liquidated in the Nazi blood purge of June, 1934. The official version then given out by the Nazis was that Strasser was arrested and had committed suicide in his cell. From Strasser's widow, however, Subject was told that Strasser was shot through the back of the head, a wound he could not have inflicted himself.

Settlement of the Strasser estate was entrusted to Subject and Dr. Carlos Wetzel, a member of the "Vorstand" of Soehring. The most important asset of the Strasser estate was a life insurance policy for RM 20,000 issued by the Allianz & Stuttgarter Lebensversicherungsbank A.G. This policy, however, contained a clause that no payment should be made if death of the insured occurred through suicide. In view of this clause and of the official version of Strasser's death, the insurance company refused payment. To help Strasser's widow the services of Dr. Georg Eschstruth, a well-known Berlin attorney with much influence in the Nazi party and a fraternity brother of Dr. Hans Berckmeyer, chairman of the board of Soehring, was engaged. Dr. Eschstruth submitted the case to Hitler who made the following decision:

1. The insurance company was ordered to pay the RM 20,000 to Strasser's widow.
2. The insurance company was reimbursed with this amount by the Nazi Party.
3. Strasser's children, then 11 and 12 years respectively, whose godfather Hitler was, were each to receive RM 6,000 per year from Nazi Party funds until they reached the age of 18.

R. C.

201-93533

~~SECRET~~

8 February 1945

TO: Lt. Col. John S. Roller
THRU: David Williamson
FROM: Samuel Scrivener, Jr.
SUBJECT: Hannibal Plan

We forward herewith outline of the subject plan, together with a draft of a radio speech by Adolph Hitler implementing the plan. The speech is sent in English and German text.

We believe that this plan has very considerable possibilities, and we trust that it will be approved and used.

We believe that it would be best if the speech would be an actual broadcast by Hitler, preceded by a series of spaced announcements, similiar to those which preceded the Beck broadcast.

Alternatively, the Hitler message might be read over the radio by an announcer. The drafts forwarded herewith are prepared in accordance with this suggestion.

Will you please let me know what disposition is made of this plan.

Not sent - rewritten

Miss Sauter

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
8 February 1945

MO BRANCH - EU. & MED. SECTION

Plans & Production Office

- - - - -
Operational Plan
- - - - -

NAME: HANNIBAL PLAN

SITUATION: The present tri-partite conference, against the background of the desperate German military position, sets the stage for a dramatic and sweeping psychological attack on Germans. We have in mind Hitler's precept that "the bigger the lie the more believe it".

OBJECTIVE:

- 1) To create confusion in Germany.
- 2) To weaken the German war effort at home and at the front.

MEDIA: Radio

PLAN: Hitler speaks to the German people by radio from a monastery in Bavaria, over a temporarily rigged transmitter. The speech is preceded by spaced announcements, similar to those preceding the Beck broadcasts. Hitler tells the people that:

- 1) The war has not been lost.
- 2) His representatives have been meeting with Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt.
- 3) His trusted advisers tell him that military victory is not possible, that Germany will be destroyed if it does not surrender, and that his insistence on continuing the war will destroy Germany.
- 4) As the "greatest German" he cannot watch the destruction of the Reich, nor can he permit it to unconditionally surrender.
- 5) Therefore, in order to save Germany for its future great mission he orders his commanders, soldiers and workers to lay down their arms and drop their tools.
- 6) The fight for a greater Germany and National Socialist ideals must and will continue.
- 7) He thanks his commanders, soldiers and workers for their fight and for their loyalty to him.
- 8) He takes leave of his people.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET
9 February 1945

ANNOUNCER: Attention! Attention!
News of the greatest importance!
The Fuhrer has just addressed a proclamation to the
German people and the German army in which the end of hostilities
is announced.

All command posts of the German army shall at once
communicate the Fuhrer's proclamation to the troops under their
command.

All contrary orders are to be cancelled.

We are now giving the text of the proclamation which
Adolf Hitler addressed from the Fuhrer's headquarters to all
Germans at home and at the front.

* * * * *

H I T L E R:

"Men and women of the German people!

Soldiers of the Germany army! National Socialists!

If, in this hour of the severest trial and harshest
reverses which were inflicted upon the German army, but also on
the German people as a whole, I am addressing you, my fellow
countrymen and countrywomen, it is done with a feeling of the
bitterest performance of duty and in the realization of the
closest, and therefore also inextinguishable and indestructible
solidarity with the German people.

For more than twelve years, it was my highest pride
to call myself the leader and also the first worker and soldier
of the German nation and as such to be allowed to make decisive
resolutions for the entire German people and to carry them out
with iron determination. But the decision which, with a heavy
heart but, nevertheless, with a clear conscience, I have to
announce to the German people today surpasses all that providence
ever considered proper to demand of me.

I have to announce to the German people that the
hour has come when I must take leave from my fellow countrymen
and fellow warriors.

The Plutocratic-Bolshevist world conspiracy may,
in its innate boundless Jewish overweening self-estimation, evalu-
ate my decision as the expression of their monstrous campaign of
hate; but the hour will come (and it is not far away) when these
rotten world-benefactors will see that I, not they, have been
victorious.

Undefeated on all fronts, victorious with all weapons,
death-defiantly courageous in the face of the greatest dangers
which the war history of all times knows, this is how the German

SECRET

held out in this struggle of the nations that lasted five and a half years and which was forced upon us by a gang of enemies of the people who are greedy for power and eager to destroy.

As a generation ago, the German people cannot be forced down by the use of honest weapons in the present hard struggle, either. Where man stood against man the German soldier, the German seaman, and, last but not least, the German pilot has given his last in downright superhuman achievements.

But, just as a generation ago, also this time, hate-saturated enemies, in innate cowardice, have changed the war of the armies to a fight of destruction against peaceful and helpless women, old men, and even children. History will prove that it was not we who desired, planned, and accordingly carried on unscrupulously, this kind of bestial warfare.

If today on all highways of Germany exhausted refugees collapse under the satanic fire of American air gangsters, if Berlin is overflowing with the misery of defenseless masses, if the hordes of Bolshevist murder commissars wade in the blood of German women and children as the champions of an alleged world redemption program, the blame for these monstrous crimes falls upon the gentlemen in London and Washington who are today digging their own graves in the conference with the gang leaders of a Nihilistic world revolution.

We Germans, and especially we National Socialists, step before the seat of justice of world history with a clear conscience. Indefatigably and endlessly we have warned of the consequences of this blindly raging policy of revenge to which world Jewry stood sponsor. All we harvested from Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt for our unlimited sacrificial courage was light-hearted mockery and terroristic threats.

Nevertheless, I have, last month, accepted the good services of the leader of a friendly state in order to try, all justified scruples to the contrary notwithstanding, to shake this so-called world conscience out of the permanent sleep of democratic imbecility. Once again Germany has offered the Anglo-Americans through me the hand of reconciliation for the common rescue of the occident. Also this last attempt - as I must inform the German people today - failed.

The gentlemen in Wall Street prefer ruin to an honest understanding with me and they have just threatened that they are determined, with genuinely Jewish thirst for revenge, to let the entire German people, down to the children, perish in case I and my closest associates were not surrendered.

Fellow countrymen and fellow countrywomen!

I know that no true German would lend his hand to this act of treason. But I know also that the world gangsters want to use exactly this genuinely German loyalty to the Fuhrer as a pretext in order to destroy and exterminate Germany, city

~~SECRET~~

after city, village after village. This miserable plan must be frustrated. Under the present military conditions, however, I see only one way of frustrating it: I shall take from the gentlemen in London, Washington, and Moscow all excuse for the continuation of their systematic destruction of Germany.

The common weal - that is what we National Socialists have taught and believed - is above egotism. I and my associates have in these eternally unforgettable years lived only for the German people; also today it is only the fate of the German nation that prompts us in our unshakable decisions.

I announce to the German people the following resolutions:

First: I have ordered my associates in the Reich government to withdraw as of today from the execution of all government business and the power of command. Simultaneously, I myself resign the leadership of the German state.

Secondly: All troops are released from the oath of allegiance to me, but not from the oath of allegiance to Germany. I am ordering all German command posts to lead the German troops back to the home land in an orderly fashion and to look after a demobilization born by a spirit of discipline.

Third: All SS organizations will remain further under my command and are to execute the instructions which had been given them in advance in case Germany should lay down her arms.

Fourth: All German diplomats will also stay at their posts and are to hold themselves in readiness for the initiation of peace negotiations.

Fifth: I expect of the entire German people, and especially of my fellow partymen that they, above all, feel as Germans and act as Germans now in the coming peace years as they did during the long sacrificial war years. I expect that the spirit of the dead of this bloody war will not extinguish under the trials of the post-war years.

I herewith take my leave, with a heavy heart and filled with gratitude for the loyalty shown me, from the German people and the German army. I will not capitulate. I have my plans and I shall carry them out. Whatever the future may bring for the German people: I shall be with you in spirit!

Would that the Almighty give his protection to the German people to whom I can no longer speak."

~~SECRET~~

SPRECHER: Achtung! Achtung!
Eine Nachricht von groesster Tragweite!
Der Fuehrer hat soeben einen Aufruf an das
deutsche Volk und an die deutsche Wehrmacht erlassen, in dem die
Beendigung der Feindseligkeiten angekündigt wird.

Alle Kommandostellen der deutschen Wehrmacht haben den
Aufruf des Fuehrers sogleich an die ihnen unterstellten Truppen zu
verlautbaren.

Alle gegenteiligen Befehle gelten als aufgehoben.

Wir bringen jetzt den Wortlaut der Proklamation, die
Adolf Hitler vom Fuehrerhauptquartier aus an alle Deutschen, in
der Heimat und der Front, gerichtet hat.

* * * * *

H I T L E R:

"Maenner und Frauen des deutschen Volkes!

Soldaten der deutschen Wehrmacht! Nationalsozialisten!

Wenn ich mich in dieser Stunde schwerster Pruefung und haer-
tester Schicksalsschlaege, die dem deutschen Heer, aber auch dem
deutschen Volk in seiner Gaenze auferlegt wurden, an Sie, meine
Volksgenossen und Volksgenossinnen, wende, dann geschieht es mit
einem Gefuehl bitterster Pflichterfuellung und im Bewusstsein
innerster und daher ebenso unloesbarer wie unzerstoerbarer Verbunden-
heit mit dem deutschen Volk.

Mehr als zweelf Jahre lang war es mein hoechster Stolz, mich
Zugleich den Fuehrer und doch auch den ersten Arbeiter und Soldaten
der deutschen Nation nennen und als solcher fuer das gesamte deutsche
Volk entscheidende Beschluesse fassen und mit eiserner Konsequenz
durchfuehren zu duerfen. Aber der Entschluss, den ich heute schweren
Herzens doch reinen Gewissens dem deutschen Volke kundzugeben habe,
ueberschreitet alles, was die Vorsehung je mir abzufordern fuer
geboten hielt.

Ich habe dem deutschen Volk mitzuteilen, dass die Stunde gekommen
ist, in der ich mich von meinen Volksgenossen und Mitkaempfern
verabschieden muss.

Die plutokratisch-bolschewikische Weltverschwoerung mag in der
ihr angeborenen masslosen juedischen Selbstueberschaetzung meinen
Entschluss als Ausdruck des Sieges ihrer widernatuerlichen Hass-
feldzuges werten, doch die Stunde wird kommen (und sie ist nicht so
fern), da diese verrotteten Weltbegluecker sehen werden, dass ich,
und nicht sie, gesiegt habe.

Ungeschlagen an allen Fronten, siegreich in allen Waffen,

todesmutig gegenueber den groessten Gefahren, die die Kriegsgeschichte aller Zeiten kennt, so hat der Deutsche in diesem fuenf einhalb jaehrigen Voelkerringen standgehalten, das uns ein Kluengel machtgieriger und zerstoerungswuetiger Volksfeinde aufgezwungen hat.

Wie vor einem Menschenalter so ist das deutsche Volk auch in dem gegenwaertigen schweren Kampf nicht durch den Einsatz ehrlicher Waffen niederzuzwingen. Wo es Mann gegen Mann ging, dort hat der deutsche Soldat, der deutsche Seemann und nicht zuletzt der deutsche Flieger in schier uebermenschlichen Leistungen sein letztes gegeben.

Aber wie vor einem Menschenalter so haben auch diesmal hassdurchtraenkte Feinde in angeborener Feigheit den Krieg der Armeen in einen Vernichtungskampf gegen friedliche und wehrlose Frauen, Greise und selbst Kinder verwandelt. Die Geschichte wird bezeugen, dass es nicht wir waren, die diese Art bestialischer Kriegsfuehrung gewollt, geplant und demgemaess skrupellos zur Durchfuehrung gebracht haben.

Wenn heute auf allen Landstrassen Deutschlands erschoepfte Fluechtlinge unter dem satanischen Feuer amerikanischer Luftgangster zusammenbrechen, wenn Berlin ueberfliebt vom Jammer wehrloser Massen, wenn die Horden bolschewistischer Mordkommissaere als Vorkaempfer angeblicher Welterloesungsprogramme im Blute deutscher Frauen und Kinder waten-dann faellt die Schuld fuer diese monstroesen Verbrechen auf die Herren in London und Washington, die heute in der Konferenz mit dem Raedelsfuehrer einer nihilistischen Weltrevolution ihr eigenes Grab schaufeln.

Wir Deutsche, und ganz besonders wir Nationalsozialisten, treten ruhigen Gewissens vor den Richtstuhl der Weltgeschichte. Wir haben in schier ermuedender, endloser Folge vor den Folgen dieser blindwuetigen Rachepolitik gewarnt, bei der das Weltjudentum Pate gestanden ist. Alles, was wir von Seite der Herren Churchill und Roosevelt fuer unseren unbegrenzten Opfermut geerntet haben, waren leichtfertiger Spott und terroristische Drohungen.

Ich habe nichts desto trotz noch im vergangenen Monat die guten Dienste General Francos akzeptiert, um allen berechtigten Bedenken zu trotze noch einmal zu versuchen, dieses sogenannte Weltgewissen aus dem Dauerschlaf demokratischer Verbloedung aufzurütteln. Noch einmal hat Deutschland durch mich den Anglo-Amerikanern die Hand zur Versoehung und gemeinsamen Rettung des Abendlandes angeboten. Auch dieser letzte Versuch ist-wie ich heute dem deutschen Volk mitteilen muss-gescheitert.

Die Herren in der Wallstreet wollen lieber den Untergang als die ehrliche Verstaendigung mit mir und sie haben so eben angedroht, dass sie mit echt juedischer Rachsucht entschlossen seien, das ganze deutsche Volk, bis herunter zu den Kindern, zu grunde gehen zu lassen, falls ich und meine engsten Mitarbeiter nicht an sie ausgeliefert wuerden.

Volksgenossen und Volksgenossinnen!

Ich weiss, dass kein echter Deutscher seine Hand zu diesem Akt des Verrates hergeben wuerde. Aber ich weiss auch, dass die

Weltgangster gerade diese echt deutsche Treue zum Fuehrer zum Vorwand nehmen wollen, um Deutschland Stadt fuer Stadt, und, Dorf fuer Dorf auszurotten und zu vernichten. Dieser elende Plan muss zu nichte gemacht werden. Unter den gegebenen militaerischen Verhaeltnissen aber sehe ich nur einen Weg ihn zu vereiteln: ich werde den Herren in London, Washington und Moskau jeden Vorwand zur Fortsetzung ihrer planmaessigen Zerstoerung Deutschlands nehmen.

Gemeinnutz-so haben wir Nationalsozialisten gelehrt und geglaubt-geht vor Eigennutz. Ich und meine Mitarbeiter haben in diesen ewig unvergesslichen Jahren nur fuer das deutsche Volk gelebt, auch heute ist es nur das Geschick der deutschen Nation, das uns bei unseren unerschuatterlichen Entscheidungen bestimmt.

Ich gebe dem deutschen Volke folgende Beschluesse bekannt:
Erstens: Ich habe meinen Mitarbeitern in der Reichsregierung den Befehl gegeben, sich mit dem heutigen Tag von der Ausuebung aller Regierungsgeschaeft und aller Befehlsgewalt zurueckzuziehen. Gleichzeitig ziehe ich mich selbst von der Fuehrung des deutschen Staates zurueck.

Zweitens: Alle Truppen werden von mir des Treueides gegen mich, Jedoch nicht des Treueides gegen Deutschland, entbunden. Ich befehle allen deutschen Kommandostellen die deutschen Truppen ordnungsgemaess in die Heimat zurueckzufuehren und fuer eine vom Geiste der Disziplin getragene Demobilisierung Sorge zu tragen.

Drittens: Alle SS Verbaende verbleiben auch weiterhin unter meiner Kommandogewalt und haben die ihnen fuer den Fall der deutschen Waffenniederlegung bereits in vorneherein zugegangenen Instructionen auszufuehren.

Viertens: Alle deutschen Diplomaten verbleiben gleichfalls auf ihren Posten und haben sich fuer die Einleitung von Friedens unterhandlungen zur Verfuegung zu halten.

Fuenftens: ich erwarte vom gesamten deutschen Volk, und insbesondere von meinen Parteigenossen, dass sie sich wie waehrend der langen opferreichen Kriegsjahre auch in den nunmehr kommenden Friedensjahren vor allem als Deutsche fuehlen und als Deutsche handeln werden. Ich erwarte, dass der Geist der Toten dieses blutigen Krieges auch unter den Pruefungen der Nachkriegsjahre nicht zum Erloeschen kommen wird.

Ich nehme hiemit schwersten Herzens und voll Dankbarkeit fuer die mir erwiesene Treue Abschied vom deutschen Volk und vom deutschen Heer. Ich werde nicht kapitulieren. Ich habe meine Plaene und ich werde sie zur Durchfuehrung bringen. Was immer auch die Zukunft fuer das deutsche Volk bringen mag: ich werde im Geist mit euch sein!

Moege der Allmaechtige dem deutschen Volk, zu dem ich nicht mehr zu sprechen vermag, seinen Schutz angedeihen lassen!"

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

11 Oct 1955

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

RI/ (A)

TELEPHONE

NO.

[Admin. Notation] - 1534

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D			
1. WH BARTON HALL	046	24 OCT 1955		Wm		6 Hitler, Adolph orig RT Chino detached
2. I		OCT 25 1955	OCT 25 1955	Wt	Logged	cc - 3-4. Shall we have the Station ask [FCI] to check this out? Please detach your copy
3. [CIA Employee]						
4. [CIA Employee]						
5. [CIA Employee]						
6. [CIA Employee]						
7. [CIA Employee]		8 NOV 1955	8 NOV 1955	B		[Admin. Notation] - 1105
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13. INDEX CS COPY						
14.						
15. RI/ (A) NOV 1955 10	1409 L					

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201	93533
ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE	8 OCT 1955

FORM NO. 1 APR 55 610

REPLACES FORM SI-10 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED (40)

(A) Admin. Notation

NUF - 000033

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(1)

(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

ORIGINAL COLLECTION
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. (P) 7-1534

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WHD

DATE 11 October 1955

FROM [CIA JOB TITLE] [CIA/LA] RM

Info: [CIA/LA]
[CIA/LA]

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Adolph HITLER

REF: (P) 1-2592, 3 October 1955
(P) 1-472, 10 Oct 1955

If Headquarters desires, through 7. [CIA/LA] Station can make inquiry concerning "Adolph SCHUTTELMAYER, Tunga, Colombia, 1954."

SCHUTTELMAYER

- [CIA Employee]

11 October 1955

Distribution:

- 3 - Washington
- 1 - [CIA/LA]
- 1 - [CIA/LA]

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

RI COPY

11 Oct 55
[Admin Notation] 1534
501-93533

NO WATCH CRIMES OF SOLI - THE ACT

2000

RELEASE AS SA

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

17 Oct 55

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:		TELEPHONE NO.			
RI/ (A)		[Admin. Notation] - 472			
DATE					
TO	ROOM NO.	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FW'D		
1. WH	046		26 OCT 1955		HITLER, A do lph cc: chrono detached &
2. I		OCT 26 1955	OCT 26 1955	nt Lyyer	
3. [CIA Employee]		27 Oct 55		ard	
4. [CIA Employee]		OCT 27 1955	OCT 27 1955	Jas	
5. [CIA Employee]		29 Oct		dep	
6.					
WH III					
[Admin. Notation]					
[CIA Employee]					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13. INDEX	CS COPY				
14.					
15. RI/ (A)	1409 L				

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

201	93533
ABSTRACT	X
INDEX	X
DATE	20 OCT 1955

FORM 51-10 MAY 54

PREVIOUS EDITIONS MAY BE USED

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

2000

EXA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

7) Admin Notation

WC - 0000 32

VIA AIR POUCH
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)DISPATCH NO. [A] 472~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, WH

DATE 17 October 1955FROM [CIA JOB TITLE] CIA/LAINFO: [CIA JOB TITLE]; [CIA/LA]
[CIA JOB TITLE]; [CIA/LA]
[CIA JOB TITLE]; [CIA/LA]SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Adolf Hitler

MICROFILMED

JUL 26 1963

DOC. MICRO. SER.

REF: [A] 2592, 3 October 1955

1. With reference to the information submitted by Station [CIA/LA] concerning the alleged report that Adolf HITLER is still alive, the files of the [CIA/LA] contain similar information received from the same source, who resides in
2. An undated memorandum, believed to have been written in about mid February 1954, reflects that Phillip CITROEN, who was co-owner of the former Maracaibo Times, told a former member of this [CIA/LA] that while he was working for a railroad company in Colombia, he had met an individual who strongly resembled and claimed to be Adolf HITLER. CITROEN claimed to have met this individual at a place called "Residencias Coloniales" in Tunja, (Boyaca), Colombia, which is, according to the source, overly populated with former German Nazis. According to CITROEN, the Germans residing in Tunja follow this alleged Adolf HITLER with an "idolatry of the Nazi past, addressing him as 'der Fuhrer' and affording him the Nazi salute and storm-trooper adulation".
3. CITROEN also showed the member of this office a photograph which was taken in Colombia of himself standing next to the alleged HITLER. This photograph was borrowed for a few hours to be reproduced, but unfortunately the negatives were too poor to make copies from. The original was returned to its owner and could not be easily obtained again. Because of this and the apparent fantasy of the report, the information was not submitted at the time it was received.
4. Phillip CITROEN resides in Maracaibo with his brother, Francois, and is reported to be employed with a Dutch steamship company. Francois formerly worked for the Maracaibo Herald, and about two years ago he went into partnership with his brother Phillip and Alexander van DOBBEN, the Dutch Consul in Maracaibo as publishers of an English language newspaper, the Maracaibo Times, which is still in circulation. There is no biographical information presently available on Phillip or Francois CITROEN.

INDEX

CS COPY

[A] 472 17 Oct 55~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION[CIA Employee]
201-93533NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of
④ 1472
17 October 1955

13 October 1955

Distribution:

Wash - 3 ✓
[CIA/AF] 1
[CIA/AF] - 1
[CIA/AF] - 1
File - 2

~~SECRET~~

17 Oax 55.
[Admin
Notation] - 472
201-93 533

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 263

Box: 00023 Folder: 0001 Document: 1

Series:

Copies: 0 Pages: 1

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Hitler, Adolf DO File

Document Date: 10-03-1955

Document Type: Report

From: Chief, WHD

To: Acting

Subject: Adolph Hitler

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 36822

Withdrawn: 04-12-2004 by: Ira Kirshenbaum

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 36822 00023 0001 1

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

RI/ (A)

TELEPHONE

NO.

DATE

Admin. - 2592
Notation

TO

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

1.

WH

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

2.

I

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

3.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

4.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

5.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

6.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

7.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

8.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

9.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

10.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

11.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

12.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

13.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

14.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

15.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

16.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

17.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

18.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

19.

[CIA Employee]

ROOM NO.

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

TELEPHONE

COMMENTS

MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1963
DOC. MICRO. 5-2

11-12: HAVE RUN 2
13: may not be copying 10V

201	93533
ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE	10 OCT 1955

FORM NO. 610
1 APR 55

REPLACES FORM 51-10
WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
PLEASE AS SANITIZED

(A) Admin. Notation

C-000037

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH)

DISPATCH NO.

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

[A] 2592

DATE: 3 October 1955

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Acting [CIA JOB TITLE] [CIA/LA] w/co/B

INFO: [CIA/LA]
[CIA/LA]
[CIA/LA]

SUBJECT: GENERAL— []

SPECIFIC: Adolph HITLER

MICROFILMED

JUL 26 1963

DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. On 29 September 1955, [] reported the following. Neither [] nor this Station is in a position to give an intelligent evaluation of the information and it is being forwarded as of possible interest.
2. [] was contacted on 29 September 1955 by a trusted friend who served under his command in Europe and who is presently residing in Maracaibo. [] preferred not to reveal the identity of his friend.
3. [] friend stated that during the latter part of September 1955, a Phillip CITROEN, former German SS trooper, stated to him confidentially that Adolph HITLER is still alive. CITROEN claimed to have contacted HITLER about once a month in Colombia on his trip from Maracaibo to that country as an employee of the KNSM (Royal Dutch) Shipping Co. in Maracaibo. CITROEN indicated to [] friend that he took a picture with HITLER not too long ago, but did not show the photograph. He also stated that HITLER left Colombia for Argentina around January 1955. CITROEN commented that inasmuch as ten years have passed since the end of World War II, the Allies could no longer prosecute HITLER as a criminal of war.
4. On 28 September 1955, [] friend surreptitiously obtained the photograph which CITROEN referred to. On 29 September 1955, the photo was shown to [] for purposes of getting his reaction to the possible veracity of this fantastic story. Obviously, [] was not in any position to make any comments. Nonetheless, he borrowed the photograph long enough so that this Station could take any action deemed advisable. Photostats of this picture were taken, and are being forwarded. The photograph was to be returned to its owner the following day. The person on the left is alleged to be CITROEN and the person on the right is undoubtedly the person which CITROEN claims is HITLER. The back side of the photograph contained the following data: "Adolf SCHRIETTMAYOR, Tunga, Colombia, 1954."

1 Att. W/W

DNB/lac

Attachment: 1 photo

3 October 1955

3 - Headquarters, w/1 att. in dupl.

1 - [CIA/LA] w/1 att., 1 copy

1 - [CIA/LA] w/1 att., 1 copy

1 - [CIA/LA] w/1 att., 1 copy

2 - Files, w/1 att., 1 copy

Secret

CLASSIFICATION

INDEX

CS COPY

MAR 1949

NAT. WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

2000

RI COPY.

[CIA Employee]

3 Oct 55

[A] 2592

701-93233

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/11/01 BY 60322 UCBAW

18



MICROFILMED
JUL 26 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Adolf Schüttelmayer
Columbia. Tunga.
America del Sur. 1954 jr.

ADA 4/11 [Adm. & Notation] 2592

3 Oct 58
201-93533

ED

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 4 1955

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark sufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM	TO	ROOM NO.	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	TELEPHONE	NO. IN FILE	DATE	COMMENTS
WH/ (A)						1105	28 October 1955	
101			28 Oct	AM				
102			28 Oct	AM				
103			31 Oct	RB				
104			2/1/56	AM				
105				AM				
106								
107								
108								
109								
110								
111								
112								
113								
114								
115								
116								
117								
118								
119								
120								
121								
122								
123								
124								
125								
126								
127								
128								
129								
130								
131								
132								
133								
134								
135								
136								
137								
138								
139								
140								
141								
142								
143								
144								
145								
146								
147								
148								
149								
150								
151								
152								
153								
154								
155								
156								
157								
158								
159								
160								
161								
162								
163								
164								
165								
166								
167								
168								
169								
170								
171								
172								
173								
174								
175								
176								
177								
178								
179								
180								
181								
182								
183								
184								
185								
186								
187								
188								
189								
190								
191								
192								
193								
194								
195								
196								
197								
198								
199								
200								

FORM NO. 610 REPLACES FORM 31-10 APR 55 WHICH MAY BE USED

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(1)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

ADZVAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Admin Notation

ORIGINAL COLLECTOR

ORIGINAL SANITIZER

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. ① 7-1105

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

NOV 4 1955

TO [CIA JOB TITLE], [CIA/LA]

DATE _____

FROM Chief, WHD

[CIA JOB TITLE], [CIA/LA]
[CIA JOB TITLE] [CIA/LA]

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Adolph Hitler 201-7-533

Reference: ① 7-1534, 11 October 1955
① 7-2592, 3 October 1955
① 7-472, 17 October 1955

1. Headquarters has no objections to Station's passing this information to 7 but it is felt that enormous efforts could be expended on this matter with remote possibilities of establishing anything concrete. Therefore, we suggest that this matter be dropped.

2. Should the Station pass the information to 7, correction should be made to Subject's name to SCHUTTELMAYER and the city to Tunja, Colombia..

28 October 1955

Distribution:

- 3 - [CIA/LA]
- 1 - [CIA/LA]
- 1 - [CIA/LA]
- 1 - WH/I/Chrono
- 1 - WH/I/Subject
- 1 - WH/Mailroom

WH/I/[CIA Employee]

[CIA Employee]
(J. C. KID), CWH
by
[CIA Employee]

[CIA Employee]
[CIA Employee]

.....(cc)

ACWH

add with ①
(Coordinating officer)

[CIA Employee]
(Authentication officer)

[CIA Employee], C/WH/I

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
PLEASE AS SANITIZED